









The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) was 
established in 1991.  CHERE is a centre of excellence in health economics and 
health services research. It is a joint Centre of the Faculties of Business 
and Nursing, Midwifery and Health at the University of Technology, Sydney, in 
collaboration with Central Sydney Area Health Service. It was established as a 
UTS Centre in February, 2002. The Centre aims to contribute to the development 
and application of health economics and health services research through 
research, teaching and policy support. CHERE’s research program encompasses 
both the theory and application of health economics. The main theoretical 
research theme pursues valuing benefits, including understanding what 
individuals value from health and health care, how such values should be 
measured, and exploring the social values attached to these benefits. The 
applied research focuses on economic and the appraisal of new programs or new 
ways of delivering and/or funding services. CHERE’s teaching includes 
introducing clinicians, health services managers, public health professionals 
and others to health economic principles. Training programs aim to develop 
practical skills in health economics and health services research. Policy 
support is provided at all levels of the health care system by undertaking 
commissioned projects, through the provision of formal and informal advice as 
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This study investigates the role of dynamic, discrete choice modelling in the context of 
private hospital insurance in Australia.    This is achieved with the use of a unique panel 
data set of young Australian women – The Australian Longitudinal Study on Women’s 
Health (or ALSWH).    Very few (if any) private health insurance studies in Australia 
have used panel data due to the limited availability of longitudinal data sets.  Yet panel 
data allows two important innovations – it allows a researcher to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across individuals and facilitates dynamic modelling that would otherwise 
require long time series data.     
 
Both these innovations are a feature of the dynamic, random effects probit model I 
propose here.  Using the ALSWH data set I find that the choice to purchase private 
hospital insurance is strongly determined by income, access to hospitals and inertia in 
choice.  I also find family formation, pregnancy, education, exercise levels and country of 
birth to be significant drivers of choice.  Interestingly, I find little evidence of adverse 
selection in this sample of young women, as those more likely to be insured have higher 
self-reported health and few chronic conditions.     
 
Overall, I find the dynamic specification with state dependence effects provides an 
important insight into consumer behaviour, with young women exhibiting statistically 
and economically large amounts of inertia in choice.  Women who were in cover in 1996 
or 2000 were more likely to be covered in 2003.  Conversely, women without cover were 
unlikely to move into cover despite a wide range of Australian Government incentives.    
As policy makers consider the future of private health care, researchers must consider 
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Private health insurance generates benefits for individuals and society as a whole.  At the 
individual level, insurance allows an individual to save in times of good health in 
preparation for high expenditures in times of ill health.  At the aggregate or societal level, 
insurance is a risk pooling tool where individuals with low expected cost (low risk) can 
offset individuals with high expected medical expenditures.   Yet risk pooling can be 
problematic due to certain market failures, such as asymmetric information.   A greater 
understanding of why individuals choose to participate in the private health insurance 
market can be made with dynamic, discrete choice models. 
 
Australia has a supplementary private health insurance system running parallel to the 
public system of universal coverage - Medicare.   In recent years, Medicare and the 
public hospital system have come under increasing financial strain.  In response, the 
Australian Government introduced a series of incentives to encourage greater uptake of 
private cover.  This started with the Private Health Insurance Incentives Act 1998.  This 
environment of change has led to a need for greater understanding of the type of 
Australians who purchase cover.  This study hopes to shed further light on the issue by 
using dynamic choice modelling with a panel data set.     
 
Consequently, this study will also add to the dynamic consumer choice literature, by 
applying a dynamic random effects probit to private hospital insurance choice.  This has 
not been previously attempted with Australian data, as the cross-sectional National 
Health Survey or NHS (previously the Australian Health Survey) has been the main 
source of data for empirical testing in the area.  By using the Australian Longitudinal 
Study on Women’s Health (or ALSWH), this study can gather the unique perspective of 
tracking women as they move in and out of private hospital cover.    The ALSWH also 
allows use of interesting sub-groups as it is broken down into three age cohorts.  This 
study will get a unique perspective on the choice behaviours of young (under 30 years of 
age) women, a group that is likely to be of low health risk but moving into their child-
bearing years. 
 
There are many reasons why consumers may move in and out of private health cover, 
including: 
o  changing premium levels; 
o  policy determined financial incentives (Medicare levy, Lifetime Health Cover, 30 
percent rebate);  
o  changing risk aversion levels; 
o  existence of long-term conditions/pregnancy/child rearing (direct risk measures); 
o  satisfaction or dissatisfaction with provider and the private health system; 
o  substitutability of the public system; 
o  success to hospitals and medical facilities.  
 
To a large extent these determinants can be tracked by the ALSWH panel.  Measurement 
of response to policy changes and satisfaction with public and private systems will be 
implicit in a woman’s insurance choice changes over time.  Measurement of the income 
effect, risk aversion, health conditions and hospital access will be explicit as these facets 




Finally, three mechanisms make dynamic probit modelling a natural choice.  Firstly, 
through the use of socio-economic variables, I can investigate the probability of private 
hospital insurance purchase by different types of individuals.  Secondly, by controlling 
for unobservable heterogeneity with the use of panel data, I can more accurately measure 
the effect of socio-economic characteristics on choice.  Thirdly, by making the choice 
model dynamic, I can measure the effect of persistence in choice from the previous time 
period.  Persistence has formed a significant component of choice models in other fields 
of economics such as marketing and labour economics, so inclusion of persistence in the 
choice to insure is a natural next step.   
 
 
2 INSTITUTIONAL  BACKGROUND 
 
In Australia, private health insurance either covers inpatient stays in a hospital (hospital 
cover) or covers the cost of other health services like dental care (ancillary cover).  This 
study will concentrate on the purchase of private health insurance for hospital cover, as 
this type of cover has the largest government incentive scheme supporting it, as well as 
the largest public costs associated with it [HIC (2003)].  Ancillary cover is also more 
susceptible to screening behaviours, such as health funds offering to cover non-medical 
health expenses such as gym membership.  These types of activities could be labelled 
‘preventative’ and would not have been provided by the public system in the absence of 
private cover.   
2.1  Structure of the Industry 
The private health insurance market in Australia has approximately 40 registered 
suppliers [PHIAC, 2005] but contracts offered are broadly similar, mainly due to 
community rating (see section 2.2 below).  Any variation in contracts comes from a 
consumer self selecting different deductibles, ancillary benefits and included hospital 
treatments.  There is a mix of for-profit and not-for-profit insurers.  However, the largest 
of the insurers – Medibank Private – is not for profit.  In terms of market share, the top 
six firms in the insurance industry dominate the market, holding 76.4 percent, as 
measured by premium income [PHIAC (2005), p19].   
 
Private health cover is supplementary and does not guarantee full coverage of health care 
costs or medical procedures as some commentators suggest [Gans and King (2003)].   
However, under the ‘no gap’ scheme an insurer can make an agreement with a doctor to 
ensure all medical costs are covered.  If the insurer does not offer gap cover, the 
consumer faces the risk of additional medical expenses.  If a procedure is not covered by 
the private system the consumers would still need to go through the public system.  This 
may deter the very ill or very risk averse from insurance purchase as private insurance 
would not mean sufficient or full coverage of future expenditure.   
 
The main benefit of the private system is choice, specifically choice of doctor and 
avoidance of long queues for surgery. Public patients can face long waiting lists for some 
surgeries and must take the first available doctor.  As noted by Gans and King (2003), 
belonging to a private insurer does not halt contributions to the public system.  Consumer  
 
tax contributions will still go towards the public provision of health services even if they 
purchase private cover.  
 
Quantitatively, the public system (Medicare) costs $15 billion a year (Parliament of 
Australia, Bills Digest 148, 2005).  The direct Medicare tax levy (1.5 percent of income) 
only accounts for $6.1 billion, with the rest coming from regular taxes. The possible 
fiscal strain of Medicare necessitates a well functioning private system if costs continue 
to increase past the direct tax amount.   On the supply side, benefits paid by private 
insurance providers for hospital services totalled $2.2 billion in 2004-05 [PHIAC (2005)].  
This is often cited as the reason for regular premium increases over and above the 
inflation rate for the past 10 years [Private Health Insurance Ombudsman (2005)].  Yet 
premium increases can partially be explained by the current legislative environment.   
Under the current system, the Minister for Health and Ageing does not approve premium 
changes but does have the power to disallow changes if necessary.  This power has not 
been exercised to date [HICA (2006)]. 
2.2 Community  Rating 
Premium pricing in Australia is constrained by community rating.  Insurers do not have 
the ability to discriminate in pricing based on sex, prior history of illness or any other 
risk/utilization characteristics.  Only discrimination based on age is allowable (see 
Lifetime Health Cover below).  Accordingly, actuarially fair pricing should reflect 
average risk over the insured pool, not the expected risk of an individual.   This should 
also lead to age becoming a strong, positive determinant of the choice to insure.   
 
In order to widen discussion, I will define risk explicitly.  For the purposes of this study 
risk will be taken to mean the risk of future health expenditures.  A high risk consumer 
would have a higher than average expected health expenditure.  A low risk consumer 
would have the opposite – lower than average expected health expenditure.  Thus, in the 
presence of community rating, the risk pool becomes important as insurers can only 
differentiate on the basis of age.  Inefficient pooling can lead to market failure if the 
ability to discriminate between risk types is hampered by asymmetric information.   
Specifically, insurance premiums are no longer actuarially fair for low risk types.  These 
low risk types then opt out, leaving the pool of insured with only high risk individuals.  
Under this separating equilibrium all the low risk individuals would exit the market and 
only high risk individuals would be sharing the risk [Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)]. 
 
Therefore, community rating should discourage low risk consumers from purchasing, as 
insurance premiums will be overpriced given their expected usage.  Various studies 
[Vaithianathan (2004), Gans and King (2003)] have looked at the effect community 
rating has on the Australian market.  Specifically, many commentators see community 
rating as the main reason for declining insurance rates as healthy people drop out because 
premiums do not match their risk profile.   This study will focus on the young cohort of 
the ALSWH, a group that should be composed of mainly low risk types.  If these 




The private health insurance market is highly regulated, with three main pieces of 
legislation: the National Health Act 1953, the Health Insurance Act 1973 and the Private 
Health Insurance Incentives Act 1998 [PHIAC (2005)].   The Private Health Insurance 
Incentives Act 1998 (PHIIA) replaced the Private Health Insurance Incentives Scheme 
1997 (PHIIS) and includes the incentives listed below.  The National Health Act 1953 
provides the main framework for the private health insurance industry by defining 
concepts such as what health insurance is, and who can offer it – requiring an annual 
report entitled ‘Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations’ prepared by 
the Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC).  The majority of this 
legislation is aimed at increasing uptake of private cover in Australia, often labelled the 
‘carrots and sticks’ of the health insurance industry [Hall, de Abreu Lourenco and Viney 
(1999)]. 
 
2.3.1  Australian Government Rebate 
If a person qualifies for Medicare benefits, and chooses to purchase private health 
insurance, they are entitled to a rebate from the Australian Government.  The rebate gives 
back 30 percent of the cost of insurance (for people aged up to 64 years) whether they 
purchase hospital, ancillary or a combination of both.  There is no minimum premium 
amount, and the percentage of the rebate increases with age (35 percent for people aged 
between 65 and 69, 40 percent for people over 70) [PHIAC (2005)].  This rebate was 
introduced on 1 January 1999, and revised on 1 April 2005 (to include more people).    
The rebate directly affects consumers in the ALSWH sample by making private health 
insurance cheaper to buy, but the direct price change effect is not measured in the 
ALSWH.   
 
2.3.2  Lifetime Health Cover 
Lifetime Health Cover imposes a penalty on people who do not take out hospital cover 
with a registered health fund before the age of 31.  If a person decides to take out cover 
later in life, they are subject to a two percent excess over the normal premium level for 
every year since the age of 30. This policy has been designed to stop churning 
behaviours, to get consumers into insurance early and to keep them covered for life.  This 
initiative was introduced on 1 July 2000 (but actually came into effect on 15 July 2000).    
The women in the ALSWH sample are all below 30 and would therefore not be 
susceptible to Lifetime Health Cover changes.  However, forward planning women may 
have brought in anticipation of the Lifetime Health Cover effect.   
 
2.3.3  Medicare Levy Surcharge  
Contribution to Medicare through taxes is compulsory under The Medicare Levy Act 
1986.  This comes either directly through the 1.5 percent Medicare levy but is 
supplemented with general taxation revenue.  The Medicare Levy Surcharge introduced 
an extra 1 percent tax on income for people with higher incomes who do not have a 
certain level of hospital insurance.  The threshold for high-income is a single person with 
a taxable income greater than $50,000 or a family/couple with a combined taxable 
income of $100,000.  The required level of hospital cover is $500 per annum or above for  
 
single policies or $1000 per annum for families/couples.  The levy surcharge was 
introduced on 1 July 1997 to encourage uptake of private health insurance among high 
income earners.  Measurement of personal income and household income in the ALSWH 
data set allows direct identification of women affected by the surcharge. 
 
2.3.4  Gap Cover Schemes 
Medical gap legislation was added to the National Health Act in 1995 and modified in 
2000 to give consumers certainty over future health expenditures.  Insurers now have to 
offer at least one ‘no gap’ or ‘known gap’ policy for a given hospital treatment to reduce 
the amount of out-of-pocket costs a consumer faces for private treatment.  The change in 
2000 meant gap cover agreements no longer had to be with a specific doctor, although 
participation in the scheme is still at the doctor’s discretion.   This will affect consumer 
choice because guaranteed coverage should increase purchase by risk averse consumers 
who would prefer a fixed premium to uncertain future medical expenditures. 
 
Overall, these incentives should lead to a positive relationship between the choice to 
insure and level of income, and a positive relationship between the choice to insure and 
age. 
2.4  Does a private insurance system take the pressure off the public 
system? 
The underlying policy motive of private sector promotion is to reduce the burden on 
public hospitals [(Hurley, Vaithianathan, Crossley, Cobb-Clark (2002)].  Yet the 
existence of a private system is not clear proof financial incentives to private cover have 
reduced the public burden.  Hurley et al. (2002) identify three conditions that must hold 
to establish a causal link between increased private insurance and decreased public costs: 
o  subsidies must increase private hospital insurance;  
o  private cover must reduce the costs in the public sector; 
o  savings from the reduction in the public sector costs must outweigh the subsidies 
forgone to increase private insurance levels.   
This study will mainly concentrate on the first point.  Specifically, if uptake during the 
time of the subsidies was related to specific socio-economic characteristics.  The direct 
cost reductions from private sector coverage are an equally important policy question but 
are beyond the scope of this study. 
2.5 Managed  Competition 
A proposed alternative to the current two-tiered public-private system is a market of 
managed competition [Scotton (1990), Hall (2004)].  As Hall (2004) notes, managed 
competition will only work under certain conditions.  One of these conditions is informed 
and mobile consumers that choose rationally across providers to ensure efficiency.  Yet if 
consumers display inertia when choosing between public and private insurance, they are 
likely to display inertia when choosing between separate private providers.  Hence, 
dynamic modelling results have implications for future changes to the private health 
insurance system.   
 
 
3 LITERATURE  REVIEW 
 
Debate over factors driving insurance choice spans public policy circles, national media, 
and health economics literature.   Private insurance remains a debated topic for several 
reasons.  First, a general trend of falling memberships over the last quarter century has 
been attributed to market failures in the form of informational asymmetry [Butler (2001)].   
Second, in response to these failures, the Australian Government introduced a series of 
financial incentives to encourage uptake.   Finally, the insurance decision appears to 
exhibit inertia, such that the decision to insure last period will be a significant predictor of 
the decision to insure this period.   Following these three broad topics, the literature 
review below will examine insurance market failure, consumer responses to financial 
incentives, and drivers of insurance choice.  
3.1  Insurance Market Failure 
The effects of market failure have been widely modelled in the insurance literature.  The 
issue of poor risk pooling, as mentioned above, can be the result of asymmetrical 
information problems, specifically adverse selection.  For adverse selection to exist, 
correlation between insurance coverage and risk should be positive.  This is expected for 
two reasons [Gardiol, Geoffard, Grandchamp (2005)].  The selection effect means 
consumers who expect high future utilisation costs will select into insurance and smooth 
their income across uncertain states.  The incentive effect means consumers with more 
comprehensive cover will have greater expenditures.    The selection effect manifests into 
an adverse selection problem where people who are sicker (higher risk) will benefit more 
from, and cost more to insure, than people who are healthy  [see Chiappori and Salanie 
(2000), Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999) for a more detailed definition].  The incentive 
effect manifests in the moral hazard problem where the insured population engage in 
over-utilisation of services.    Many studies have found purchasers of insurance are much 
more likely to be high users [Olivella and Vera-Hernandez (2006), Savage and Wright 
(2003)].  If adverse selection is present, insurance companies will offer less generous 
policies over time and/or raise premiums, leading healthy people to opt out, leaving a 
final pool of sick people.    This is characterised as a market failure because risk pooling 
is no longer optimal [Gans and King (2003)].  For the purposes of this study, a positive 
correlation between the risk type (as measured by health) and insurance choice will be 
considered evidence of adverse selection.  This would then constitute market failure.   
 
It should also be noted that correctly identifying poor risk pooling and adverse selection 
can be problematic.  There is mixed empirical evidence of whether adverse selection 
exists in insurance markets.   Studies such as Chiappori and Salanie (2000) of a sample of 
young French automobile drivers found no evidence of adverse selection because 
information available to insurance companies is actually extremely rich.  Conversely, 
adverse selection is supported by Ettner (1997) who uses a sample of Medicare 
beneficiaries to show that people who purchase private supplemental insurance use more 
physician services, and have higher Medicare costs.     
 
The amount of adverse selection in the Australian market has been the subject of many 
empirical studies and debate.  Barrett and Conlon (2003) found evidence of this ‘adverse  
 
selection spiral’ using two cross-sections of the National Health Survey, although both 
cross-sections (1989, 1995) were collected before the introduction of Lifetime Health 
Cover and the Federal rebate.  Pauly and Zheng (2003) note that without the ability to 
charge high risk customers higher premiums insurers are unlikely to force consumers to 
reveal their true type.  
3.2  Incentive Response Literature 
Much of the Australian health insurance literature has focused on which incentive change 
has been most effective for increasing aggregate memberships.  Overall, the recent 
subsidies introduced by the Australian Government to promote private health insurance 
have coincided with an increase in population coverage from 30.1 to 45.7 percent over 
the period July 1997 to July 2000 [Frech, Hopkins and MacDonald (2003), see also figure 
4.4]. 
 
The 30 percent rebate has been one of the most controversial pieces of legislation due to 
the large cost it represents to the Australian Government.  Butler (2001) has estimated the 
rebate costs the Australian Government around $2 billion a year. Frech and Hopkins 
(2004) point out that the rebate does carry a positive fiscal externality to the extent that 
increases in private coverage reduce the welfare loss of rationing by waiting.  Gans and 
King (2003) use a similar justification.   
 
Although Lifetime Health Cover means a departure from community rating 
[Vaithianathan (2004)], it appears to have been the most effective in terms of increasing 
aggregate insurance levels [Butler (2001)].  In fact many commentators believe the 
presence of universal cover and community rating are a hindrance to any growth in the 
private health insurance system [Hall, de Abreu Lourenco and Viney (1999), 
Vaithianathan (2004)].  Equilibrium is affected by community rating as low-risk 
consumers opt out of private cover into self insurance, thus leading to the adverse 
selection spiral. As a possible way of reducing the informational asymmetry inherent in 
community rating, insurers offer a menu of contracts that have different coverage levels.  
As the women in the ALSWH sample are not subject to Lifetime Health Cover penalties 
directly (all respondents are under the age of 31 in the 2003), it is easier to separate the 
rebate and Lifetime Cover effects.   
3.3  Insurance Choice Literature  
When investigating health insurance, many strong results in the literature help form 
expected relationships between predictor variables and the choice to insure.  For the 
purposes of this study two groups of literature will impact – the literature examining 
effects of socio-economic variables, and the literature of dynamic consumer choice.   
3.3.1  Individual Characteristics 
Fortunately many previous papers have studied insurance choice in Australia and patterns 
have emerged of expected significant variables in the choice equation. Socio-economic 
characteristics that have a large effect on the choice to insure are income, employment, 
education, age, sex, family formation, area of residence and country of birth.   
  
 
Income is found to be a dominating influence on health insurance choice, both in 
Australia [Barrett and Conlon (2003), Doiron et al. (2006), Savage and Wright (2003), 
Hopkins and Kidd (1996)], and overseas [Propper (1989)].  The Australian literature 
using spouse or family income also found it to be very significant, indicating the decision 
to insure is made by the income unit and not the individual.  For this reason, both 
personal and household income will be included in the analysis.   
 
Being employed also increases the likelihood of being insured, whether it is the head of 
the family [Propper (1989)] or the individual that is employed [Savage and Wright 
(2003)].  In a related manner, higher levels of education have a positive effect on the 
insurance choice [Doiron et al. (2006), Hopkins and Kidd (1996)] as learning is 
associated with greater ability to gather information and use health stock effectively.   
This is consistent with the seminal Grossman (1972) model of health stock. 
 
Age has a positive effect on the decision to insure [Cardon and Hendel (2001), Barrett 
and Conlon (2003), Savage and Wright (2003)] but this diminishes in the retirement 
stages of life [Doiron et al. (2006)].  This is consistent with responses to Lifetime Health 
Cover and greater expected utilization as a consumer ages.  The quadratic effect captures 
consumers of retirement age who have greater access to government subsidised health 
care (substitute to private insurance).  As this study will only look at a younger age 
cohort, only the positive effect is expected.   
 
Being female is also associated with greater coverage [Cutler and Fiebig (2005)] and 
being male is associated with less coverage [Cardon and Hendel (2001)].  Again, this is 
consistent with females having greater expected utilisation through child-bearing.   
Having dependent children is itself associated with being covered [Doiron et al. (2006), 
Hopkins and Kidd (1996)], as is family formation.  If the income unit is a couple or 
married pair with or without dependents, it indicates a greater likelihood of cover [Doiron 
et al. (2006), Hopkins and Kidd (1996)] either as the result of higher combined wealth, or 
an expectation of future use if the family grows.   
 
Area of residence is important due to differences in health care services.  Living in a rural 
area is associated with lower coverage [Doiron et al. (2006)] as is living in the State of 
Queensland [Barrett and Conlon (2003), Hopkins and Kidd (1996)].  This has been 
credited to historical differences in health care in Queensland [Hopkins and Kidd (1996)]. 
 
Country of birth is a significant predictor, although the reasons why are less clear.   
Barrett and Conlon (2003) find that non-Australian born consumers are less likely to 
purchase cover, perhaps indicating different attitudes to insurance in other countries.   
 
Health and risk factors also govern the choice to insure with smoking, alcohol 
consumption, and having a chronic condition being significant determinants.  Some risk 
factors can indicate either attitudes to risk or a direct measure of future riskier states, and 
often the distinction is unclear.   
 
Smoking is a consistent indicator of non-purchase [Doiron et al. (2006), Savage and 
Wright (2003), Barrett and Conlon (2003), Hopkins and Kidd (1996)] indicating smoking 
may proxy lower risk aversion instead of higher risk type.  However, weight measures 
(such as body mass index or BMI) are positively correlated with purchase [Barrett and  
 
Conlon (2003)] indicating BMI may proxy a higher risk type instead of lower risk 
aversion.  Self-reported health status is also a consistently significant predictor although 
unexpectedly, those with better self-reported health are more likely to purchase [Doiron 
et al. (2006), Barrett and Conlon (2003)].   This may be the result of bias caused by 
unobserved, individual specific heterogeneity and is explored below.   
 
Objective health measures should be more consistent measures of the risk type of an 
individual, given that conditions such as asthma may lead to more hospitalisation.  Both 
Doiron et al. (2006) and Barrett and Conlon (2003) found chronic conditions to be a 
significantly positive predictor.    Hopkins and Kidd (1996) also found that frequency of 
doctor consultations are significant, although measuring utilisation as part of the decision 
to insure, suffers from endogeneity problems.    
 
If the consumer holds a government health care card (which covers some services that 
private health insurance would normally cover) they are also less likely to purchase 
[Barrett and Conlon (2003), Cutler and Fiebig (2005)].  Consumers are eligible for a 
health care card if they are low income earners, foster carers or in receipt of certain 
government benefits [Centrelink (2006)].   Therefore, health care cards can be viewed 
here as a proxy for receipt of government benefits which indicates lower wealth and 
disposable income.   
 
Cutler and Fiebig (2005) also review the literature on reasons for non-purchase of health 
insurance.  Generally consumers without private insurance have lower levels of risk 
adversity, lower income, lower financial ability to self-insure, and are ignorant of the 
risks covered by insurance.  
 
Finally, none of the papers mentioned above used measure of pregnancy status and child-
bearing aspirations, probably due to lack of data availability.  Using the ALSWH data set, 
this study can model the effect of pregnancy directly, thus filling a gap in the literature.  
The ALSWH data set also measures self-reported access to hospitals which is also rarely 
measured.  Also, the price or premium would also affect the decision to purchase, but is 
hard to measure [see Vaithianathan (2004) for an estimate], and will not be attempted 
here.   
3.3.2  Dynamic Choice Literature  
There are two main motivations for using a dynamic model over a cross-sectional or 
static panel model.  The first – controlling for unobservable heterogeneity – is in direct 
response to a gap in the health economics literature.  The second – to look at changes 
over time – is a response to the success of dynamic choice modelling in other fields of 
economics such as marketing where persistence in choice (also called state dependence) 
explains much of the choice problem.  Separating the effects of unobserved 
heterogeneity, persistence in choice and the socio-economic characteristics mentioned 
above will give a more complete model of the choice to purchase private hospital 
insurance.   
 
To date, the vast majority of Australian private health insurance studies have been cross-
sectional.  One difficulty with cross-sectional analysis is controlling for unobservable 
heterogeneity across individuals.  Doiron et al. (2006) find their counterintuitive result on 
self-assessed health could be “driven by heterogeneity in personality traits including the  
 
level of risk aversion”. Panel data can be the answer to an expanded knowledge of health 
insurance choice by controlling for this unobserved heterogeneity.  As Kennedy (2003, 
p302) notes, panel data has many advantages over cross-sectional and time series data.  
Panel data can: 
o  control for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level;  
o  give more information through greater variability so that estimation is more 
efficient; 
o  allow examination of dynamic effects which would otherwise require a long time-
series.   
 
Panel data controls for unobserved heterogeneity (or time constant individual effects) 
either by controlling for it, differencing it out, or assuming it is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables [Wooldridge (2002) p252].  Consider first a linear specification of 
an unobserved effects model, 
T 1,...,      t N 1,...,     i                 ) , , | ( 0 = = + + + = it i it it i it it a a y E ε β ε β x x            (3.1) 
Here the dependant variable yit is conditional on a vector of explanatory variables Xt, and 
a composite stochastic term.  The stochastic term has an unobserved individual effect, ai, 
and an idiosyncratic time-varying error, .  Different assumptions about a it ε i will 
determine whether a fixed effects, first differenced, or random effects panel model is 
used.   If ai is assumed to be correlated with the explanatory variables a fixed effects 
model would be used.   Under fixed effects, time de-meaning removes ai and gives 
unbiased parameter estimates.  If there are two time periods only a straight first 
differencing would control for ai by differencing it away along with any time constant 
variables.  If ai is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables a random 
effects model would be used.   Under random effects, ai  would be treated as a random 
variable such that E(a|x i it) = E(ai) = 0.  Given previous studies in the private health 
insurance area have been susceptible to bias caused by unobserved individual effects, it 
seems a fixed effects specification would be ideal.  However, when the dependant 
variable is discrete and binary – which the choice to insure is – fixed effects estimation 
can suffer from an incidental parameters problem [Wooldridge (2002) p 484; Greene 
(2003) p 697].  When fixed effects estimators are assumed in binary probit models, 
maximum likelihood will not give consistent estimates of the model parameters.  Greene 
(2003, p 697) notes a further problem – fixed effects estimators will be biased in small 
samples.  As the data set used in this study has a small, fixed T, estimation with fixed 
effects will suffer from this bias.   
 
This leaves estimation by random effects probit.  Early work on the random effects probit 
model was done by Chamberlain (1984, p1270), Butler and Moffitt (1982) and Mundlak 
(1978).   A static random effects probit makes an additional assumption to the E(a|x i it) = 0 
assumption made in the linear context [Wooldridge (2002) p 485], 
                                                                                      (3.2)  ) , 0 ( ~ |
2
a it i N a σ x
This implies orthogonality between the exogenous variables and the unobserved 
individual effect, ai.  As will be discussed further below, discrete dynamic choice models 
have to account for the unobserved individual effect in some sort of systematic way.  As 
lags of dependant variables violate E(a|x i it) = E(ai) = 0, the distinction between fixed and 
random effects becomes slightly blurred.    
 
 
The main motivation behind modelling the choice to insure in a dynamic framework 
rather than a static panel framework can be summed up by Propper (1989, p791) who 
notes “captivity and the effect of past purchase would be promising avenues to explore”.  
Viney, Savage and Fiebig (2006) identify the problems of churning by individuals in 
response to changes in incentives and the unexplained heterogeneity of preferences of 
people with private health insurance.   Both these studies indicate last period choice as a 
variable is an important missing factor in models of health insurance choice.   
 
As Chamberlain (1984) identified, dynamic panel data models, with discrete choice 
variables as dependents, are econometrically intricate.    Many studies assume a first-
order Markov process for the dynamic effect [Contoyannis, Jones and Rice (2004); 
Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000); Erdem and Sun (2001)] where only the most 
recent information is relevant in the choice decision.  By recent information I mean only 
a one period lag is needed to account for persistence in the dependant choice variable.  
However, the addition of a lagged dependant regressor violates the random effects 
assumption of strict exogeneity of the regressors conditional on the unobserved individual 
effect.   
 
Contoyannis, Jones and Rice (2004) note dynamic probit models must be account for 
several subtle technical issues if estimation is to be accurate.  The first of these, the initial 
conditions problem arises because the researcher may not observe the start of the choice 
process.  Contoyannis et al. (2004) note incorrect modelling of the initial conditions 
problem will lead to endogeneity bias because individuals “inherit unobserved and time-
invariant characteristics” at the start of the choice process.  
 
The second issue, correlated individual effects, results from the assumption of a random 
effects probit.  Under standard random effects probit, individual effects are assumed to be 
strictly uncorrelated with the independent variables.  In a dynamic model, the lagged 
dependant variable violates this condition.  Fortunately, Wooldridge (2005) has proposed 
a simple structure to deal with the initial conditions problem and correlated individual 
effects which is followed by Contoyannis et al. (2004), and will be followed here.    
 
Wooldridge (2005) uses a parametric framework to identify the initial conditions 
although notes this approach has disadvantages.  Wooldridge explicitly specifies a 
conditional distribution for the unobserved individual effects – but misspecification of 
this distribution will result in inconsistent parameter estimates.  While this is a potentially 
serious problem, alternative methods for estimation, using semi-parametric approaches, 
have limited application in nonlinear models because of an inability to estimate partial 
effects. Also, the conditional distribution approach has significant advantages.   
Specifically, the random effects probit can be estimated using standard software and will 
lead to easy estimation of average partial effects (Wooldridge 2004). 
 
I will also follow Contoyannis et al. (2004) in a slight modification of Wooldridge’s 
(2005) individual effects specification where the correlation is allowed through a vector 
of means rather than individual values of all time-changing variables.  The vector of 
means approach was first suggested by Mundlak (1978).   
  
 
There is one final difficulty with the use of a dynamic, random effects probit specification 
– the assumption of serially uncorrelated time-varying errors.  While the distribution of 
unobserved individual-specific errors can be accounted for using the Wooldridge 
specification, distribution of the time-varying error component is assumed to be random.  
However, these time-varying errors could be correlated, and this correlation could cause 
the maximum likelihood parameter estimates to be inconsistent.  A body of work 
addresses one possible correlation structure – that of auto-correlated time-varying errors.  
Keane (1997) has done an extensive investigation into the effect of auto-correlated time-
varying errors in multi-nominal, multi-period probit models using marketing data.  Keane 
found state dependence was still a significant driver even when the auto-correlation 
structure was directly specified.  Stewart (2006) uses maximum simulated likelihood to 
estimate random effects dynamic probit models and has written a Stata© command 
module that makes estimation relatively easy.  Unfortunately, testing for correlation in 
the time-varying errors is unfeasible with the data set used in this study due to a very 
short, wide panel.  However, it is important to note that with further waves, testing and 
possible correction for auto-correlated errors would be feasible.   
 
4 DATA 
4.1  The Data Set 
The Australian Longitudinal Study on Women’s Health (or ALSWH) is a panel survey 
which looks at the health and lifestyles of a representative sample of the Australian 
female population.  The survey, also known as ‘Women’s Health Australia’, is funded by 
the Australian Government to form a national resource of information on women’s health 
(Lee, Dobson, Brown, Bryson, Byles, Warner-Smith and Young, 2005).  The survey aims 
to give a rounded perspective of health status and health care experience by covering the 
following categories: 
o  physical and emotional health (including well-being, major diagnoses, 
symptoms); 
o  use of health services (including GP, specialist and other visits, access, 
satisfaction);  
o  health behaviours and risk factors (including diet, exercise, smoking, alcohol, 
other drugs);  
o  time use (including paid and unpaid work, family roles and leisure);  
o  socio demographic factors (including location, education, employment, family 
composition); and 
o  life stages and key events (including childbirth, divorce, widowhood). 
 
Appendix 1 gives a full list of definitions of the variables used in the choice model.  The 
ALSWH contains three age cohorts (young - aged 18-23 in 1996; mid-age - aged 45-50 in 
1996; older- aged 70-75 in 1996), with participants randomly selected from the national 
Medicare database.  The study design included deliberate over sampling of women living 
in rural and remote areas. Women living in rural and remote areas were sampled at twice 
the rate of women in urban areas, in order to try and capture the heterogeneity of health 
service experiences of women in these areas (Lee et al., 2005). Responses are collected 
through self-completion questionnaires approximately once every three years.   
  
 
This study will use three waves of the young cohort - 1996 (aged 18-23), 2000 (aged 22-
27) and 2003 (aged 25-30).    As shown in table 4.1, attrition is a problem in the ALSWH 
as non response rates increase over time.   This is mainly attributable to the high levels of 
mobility (changes of location, surname, etc) that characterise the younger generations 
(Lee et al., 2005).  Considering a true panel to be a response in all waves, the number of 
women who form a true panel is 7790.   
 
Table 4.1: Summary of the ALSWH data set 
  Wave 1: 1996  Wave 2: 2000  Wave 3: 2003 
Age of women  18 – 23  22 – 27  25 – 30 
Retention rates  100% (N = 14, 779)  66% (N = 9,690) 61%  (N = 9,074) 
Panel respondents  96% (N = 14, 247)  66% (N = 9,688)  53% (N = 7,790) 
Response recorded for 
the private hospital 
insurance question 
95% (N = 14, 070)  64% (N = 9,528)  52% (N = 7,743) 
Have private 
insurance 
32.64% 32.18% 44.98% 
Do not have private 
insurance 
67.36% 67.82% 55.02% 
 
In 1996 some women completed the survey but did not give their consent to be part of the 
longitudinal study (532 women).  In 2000 all women completing the survey were 
considered panel respondents but attrition still meant the survey was reduced to 66 
percent of the original.  In 2003 some women were recovered who had not responded in 
wave 2 leaving the sample at 61 percent of the original sample.  However, as these 
women did not complete survey 2 their data is not included for the purposes of this study.   
The final sample was then reduced to women who had responded to the private health 
insurance question, reducing to a final balanced sample of 7,743 which was 52 percent of 
the original survey group.   
 
The major advantage of using the ALSWH data to examine private health insurance 
purchase is the panel nature of the data.  Along with the wide variety of health status 
variables collected, the panel nature allows better methods of controlling for 
heterogeneity across consumers.  This partially mitigates the disadvantages, such as no 
parallel study of men, measurement problems from self-reporting, and under-sampling of 
some minority groups (Lee et al., 2005).   
 
There are also advantages from using the young cohort.  Changes in this age group - such 
as pregnancy, uptake of insurance due to Lifetime Health Cover regulations, and care of 
young children – can be major drivers of private hospital insurance purchase.  From a 
policy perspective, increased insurance purchase in this age group will mean better risk 
pooling in private insurance, possibly ending the “adverse selection death spiral” (Butler, 
2002).  Much of the previous work done on private health insurance in Australia has used 
the cross-sectional National Health Survey (NHS).  While the NHS contains a larger set 
of demographic variables and more data on hospital usage, it lacks the ALSWH’s 
emphasis on tracking individual experiences with health care and insurance.  Using the  
 
ALSWH data provides greater ability to track the consumer experience of insurance over 
time not just across individuals.   
 
4.1.1  Comparison to the Australian Population 
Potential bias from sampling has been addressed by Powers (2004) with a direct 
comparison to the 2001 Australian Census.   For the purposes of this study, the ALSWH 
sample needs to be a randomly selected representation of the Australian population of 
females aged 18-23 who then became 25-30 years old during the period of observation.  
Selection bias may be an issue if the sample is non-representative.   
 
Powers finds that the ALSWH contains under representation of indigenous women, and 
women who speak a language other than English at home.  Women in the ALSWH 
sample were also more likely to be Australian born, to have never been married, have 
higher educational qualifications, be employed and work longer hours than the population 
measured by the 2001 National Census (ABS, 2001).  The over-representation of women 
with a bachelor degree or higher (38 percent compared with 24 percent in the Census) 
could indicate a more informed and aware sample, although potential bias is unclear. 
 
It is also important to compare insurance coverage rates over the Australian population to 
insurance coverage rates over the ALSWH sample.  Figure 4.1 illustrates the percent of 
the Australian population covered by private hospital insurance using three different age 
bands [PHIAC (2005), ABS (2001)].  These bands roughly correspond to the ages of 
women across the three waves of the ALSWH.   
 
In 1996, the women in the ALSWH sample should be comparable to the solid navy blue 
line (figure 4.1), indicating about 20 percent of women in the 1996 sample should be 
covered.  Referring back to table 4.1 about 32 percent of ALSWH women had private 
health insurance in 1996, inferring higher coverage in the ALSWH sample.  Similarly, 
comparing 2000 and 2003 data is problematic as the PHIAC data limits the age categories 
to 25-29 and 30-34, categories which imperfectly match the ALSWH age bands.  For 
2000, 27 percent of Australian women aged 25-29 held private cover, roughly compared 
to 32 percent of the ALSWH sample (aged 22-27 in 2000). For the second quarter of 
2002, 30 percent of women aged 25-29 had cover, roughly compared to 45 percent of the 
ALSWH sample (aged 24-29 in 2002).  This would point to an overweighting of insured 
women in the ALSWH sample, and could indicate women in the ALSWH sample bought 
private hospital insurance in anticipation of Lifetime Health Cover changes.   This 
partially limits the breadth of conclusions that can be drawn from the representativeness 
of the ALSWH sample. 
 
Comparisons to males of similar age groups (indicated by dashed lines) show trends are 
roughly similar, possibly indicating results here could be generalised across the sexes.  
However, women across all age groups have higher proportional coverage than men, 
probably indicating the child-bearing effect.   
  
 
Figure 4.1: Coverage across the Australian population 
Coverage Across the Australian Population



















Source: PHIAC Membership Tables, ABS National Census 2001 
4.2  Choice Dynamics  
As figure 4.2 shows, health insurance coverage levels have fluctuated over the past 
twenty years.  However, figure 4.2 (based on PHIAC figures), only tracks aggregate 
changes of the Australian population and does not indicate changes at the individual 
level.  To understand the true distribution of the insured population, researchers must be 
able to measure churning at the individual level.  For example, at the aggregate level, 
insurance coverage has remained fairly constant over the past three years (around 40 to 
45 percent).  This could lead to the conclusion of stability in the insurance market, and a 
halting of an adverse selection spiral.  Lifetime Health Cover could have induced low risk 
consumers to purchase insurance.  These consumers may then have dropped out of 
coverage and been replaced by higher risk, older consumers, leaving the aggregate level 
the same but increasing the risk profile of the insured pool.  This type of churning 
indicates market failure due to poor risk pooling, most likely the result of asymmetric 
information.   
 
Figure 4.2: Total private health insurance levels in Australia 



































































































































































































































A U S T
Introduction of Life Time 
Health Cover from 1 July 
2000
Commonwealth medical benefits at 30% flat rate 
restricted to those with at least basic medical cover 
from September 1981
Introduction of 
Medicare from 1 
February 1984
Medibank began on 1 July 1975.  A program of universal, 
non contributory, health insurance it replaced a system of 
government subsidised voluntary health insurance.
Introduction of 30% Rebate 
from 1 January 1999
 
Source: PHIAC, 2006  
 
 
The existence of churning behaviour can be explicitly shown.  The dichotomous table 4.2 
below clearly indicates insurance coverage across this age demographic is unstable, 
although the numbers of women churning are dominated by those staying in continuous 
cover or continuous non-cover.   
 
Table 4.2: Dichotomous table of private health insurance choice 
Group  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  No of 
women  % 
1  Continuous cover  Y  Y  Y  1430  18.4% 
2  Recent leaver  Y  Y  N  170  2.2% 
3  Leaver  Y  N  N  630  8.1% 
4  Never covered  N  N  N  3445  44.2% 
5  New joiner  N  N  Y  886  11.4% 
6  Joiner  N  Y  Y  668  8.6% 
7  Churn out  N  Y  N  132  1.7% 
8  Churn in  Y  N  Y  382  4.9% 
     Total 7743  100.0% 
 
The ‘continuous cover’ group (group 1) and the ‘never covered’ group (group 4) are of 
interest because they represent persistence in choice.  These two groups have not changed 
their insurance choice over the 1996-2003 periods despite the financial incentives and 
changes in age.  Together they account for 63 percent of the sample and give the first 
indication of how large the persistence effect could be.  The ‘recent leaver’ (group 2) and 
‘leaver’ (group 3) categories represent consumers who have left after the introduction of 
financial incentives and after the 1999-2000 aggregate increase.  At 10.3 percent, this 
group is not large but indicates a group that may have had a bad experience with private 
cover.  The ‘new joiner’ (group 5) and the ‘joiner’ (group 6) categories represent 20 
percent of consumers who have joined after the financial incentives and could be partially 
responsible for the aggregate increase.  The ‘churn in’ (group 8) and ‘churn out’ (group 
7) categories could represent consumers who have a highly elastic demand for private 
cover.    Therefore, to correctly model the insurance choice, both the persistence in 
groups 1 and 4, and the churning in other groups, must be taken into account.   
4.3 Income  Distribution 
Distribution of income at the individual and household level is important, as the choice to 
insure could be made as a single person, as a couple or as a family.  Two problems exist 
in income measurement in the ALSWH sample.  There is no income question in wave 1 
of the ALSWH data set so wave 2 (2000) and wave 3 (2003) will be relied upon for 
income information.  Also, by 2003 most households are in the highest income bracket 
($1500 per week and above – see appendix 1 for full list of income categories), meaning 
most observations are in the right hand tails of the household income distribution (see  
 
figure 4.4).  Despite these issues, it is clear income distribution is different across the 
insured and uninsured pools and different across individuals or households.  Figures 4.3 
and 4.4 are kernel densities of income across 2000 and 2003.   
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From figure 4.3 and 4.4 above, private health insurance holders have a higher income 
distribution than those without cover.  Combining this result with the incentive structure 
– income is expected to be a strong, positive predictor of the choice to purchase 
insurance. 
4.4  Reasons for Non-Purchase   
The ALSWH data set also provides detailed information as to why respondents do not 
have private hospital cover.  Respondents without insurance were asked to choose one 
response from a list of four to explain their lack of cover: ‘can’t afford’; ‘don’t get value 
for money’; ‘don’t need it’; and ‘other’.   Figure 4.5 shows the breakdown of respondents 
by year, with 2000 on the left hand side and 2003 on the right hand side.   Again,  
 
insurance purchase is highly dependent on perceived ability to purchase, as the most 
frequent response in each wave was ‘can’t afford’.  The response ‘don’t get value for 
money’ was the second most frequent in both waves, possibly indicating the price effect.   
 
The proportion of respondents who ‘can’t afford’ also drops from 2000 to 2003 as 
incomes rise.  The proportion of respondents who ‘don’t need it’ also falls from 2000 to 
2003, possibly indicating a move to child-bearing years.  Conversely, the proportion of 
respondents who feel they ‘don’t get value for money’ increases, possibly indicating 
negative experiences with the private health care system or a response to rising 
premiums.  This becomes important when examining risk pooling as increasing numbers 
of low risk consumers view insurance as poor value for money and opt out.   
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4.5 Long-term  Conditions 
If a consumer has a long-term health condition, expected future health expenditure should 
be higher than the average consumer.   In a risk pooling situation these high risk 
consumers would be balanced by low expense consumers. Table 4.3 shows the 
percentages of respondents with long-term health conditions in the insured and non-
insured categories.  Contrary to expectations, the non-insured pool contains a larger 
percentage of respondents with long-term health conditions across all six categories.  For 
conditions such as asthma, cancer and diabetes the percentage not insured is more than 
double the percentage insured.   
 
This could indicate two possibilities.  First, adverse selection may not exist in the private 
coverage pool for this age group and the high risk pool (by long-term condition) may be 
part of the publicly covered pool.  Second, long-term conditions could be correlated with  
 
another variable such as income, such that women of lower socio-economic status have 
more long-term conditions and cannot afford insurance.   
 
Table 4.3: Health condition over waves 1 to 3 















Cancer  1.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.4% 0.6% 0.3% 0.9% 0.3% 
Asthma  17%  7% 8% 3% 6% 4%  11%  5% 
Diabetes  0.8% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.5% 0.2% 
Heart  Disease  0.2%  0.1%  0.1% 0.09% 0.1% 0.06% 0.2%  0.1% 
Endometriosis --  --  2%  1%  2%  1%  1%  0.8% 
Hepatitis A or B  --  --  0.3%  0.04%  0.2%  0.06%  0.1%  0.03% 
4.6 Child-bearing 
Considering the population of interest is young women, hospitalisation for child-bearing 
and child rearing should be a strong determinant of insurance choice.  However, as table 
4.4 indicates pregnant women tend not to be insured, although this trend decreases with 
time.  By 2003 the numbers of pregnant women (or women pregnant in the last 12 
months) with and without insurance is fairly even.  This counterintuitive result could 
reflect long waiting times for obstetrics under private health cover.  Women who have 
children also tend to be uninsured, although this trend decreases with time.  This is also 
counterintuitive mothers in this age group (under 30 years of age) are likely to have 
young children with high expected medical expenses.   
 
Table 4.4: Childbearing over waves 1 to 3 
  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3 
Total  14,070 9,528  7,743 
  Not 
insured  Insured  Not 
insured  Insured  Not 
insured  Insured 
Currently pregnant  541 110 343 144  372  360 
%   3.8%  0.7%  3.5%  1.5%  4.7%  4.6% 
% of total pregnant  83%  17%  70%  30%  51%  49% 
Pregnant in last 12 
months  1,282 204  635  188  509  471 
%   9.0%  1.4%  6.6%  2%  6.5%  6% 
% of total   86%  14%  77%  23%  52%  48% 
Have children  1,971 428 1,822 509  1,539  886 
%   13.8%  3.0%  19%  5%  20%  11% 
% of total   82%  18%  78%  22%  63%  37%  
 
4.7  Risk Aversion Measures 
Doiron, Jones and Savage (2006) find a negative correlation between risk (as measured 
by self-assessed health) and the choice to insure.  As a preliminary comparison, Wave 2 
of the ALSWH also displays this inverse relationship between the respondents self-
reported level of health and their choice of insurance.   
 
Self-assessed health is measured on the y-axis on a scale of one to five where one is poor, 
and five is excellent.  Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show that increases in self-reported health are 
associated with increases in income, a relationship that is empirically consistent (Case, 
Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002).  Also revealing is the difference in the relationships 
between insured and non-insured populations.  The insured pool (solid line) has higher 
levels of self-reported health at all levels of income than the non-insured pool (dashed 
line).   
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4.8 Hospital  Access 
The ALSWH data set also measures women’s perception of access to health care 
services.  For the purposes of this study perception of hospital access is an important and 
usually unmeasured variable.  In waves 2 and 3 of the ALSWH survey women are asked 
to rate their access to hospitals as ‘excellent’, ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, ‘poor’ or ‘don’t 
know’.  While access is most likely related to area, it is interesting to investigate the 
relationship between access and income.  In figure 4.8 and 4.9 below, a lowess smooth is 
used to plot access against income, where a rating of ‘excellent’ access is given a value of 
1 and a rating of ‘poor’ access is given a rating of 5.    Two points are immediately 
apparent.  First, women without hospital insurance report much lower hospital access 
(although this manifests as a higher point on the y-axis).  Second, women with higher 
incomes report higher access levels – whether personal income or household income is 
used as the income measure.  This both these differences could point to inequitable access 
across income levels, where wealthier women with private health insurance have better 
hospital access. 
 































0 500 1000 1500
Personal Income (gross $ per week)
Have Insurance No Insurance
from: A LSW H



































0 500 1000 1500
Household Income (gross $ per week)
Have Insurance No Insurance
from: A LSW H





Therefore, preliminary investigation of the data highlights relationships that would a prior 
affect the choice to insure.  Choice appears to be dynamic, with both churning and inertia 
present in the private hospital insurance market.  Income, both personal and household is 
important – with the insured pool have a higher income distribution than the non-insured 
pool.   The prevalence of long-term conditions is unsurprisingly relatively low in this age 
group, but women with serious illness seem to choose not to insure privately.  More 
women choose to be in private cover when pregnant as age (or time) increases, but being 
a mother does not seem to induce coverage.  Women with better self-reported health 
seem more likely to purchase cover and to have higher income.  Finally, hospital access 
seems to determine a big split between women purchasing cover and women who rely on 
the public system.    Naturally, conclusions based on bivariate relationships or 
distributions are limited.  To truly understand the choice to insure a more sophisticated 
model – such as the one below – is needed.   
 
5  THE MODEL  
 
I will follow Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999) and assume that an individual is a utility 
maximising consumer whose utility depends on consumption and health.  If an individual 
is uninsured, consumption (c) will be income (y) less any health expenditure (h).  If an 
individual has insurance, consumption will be income less insurance premium (p) 
whether they are healthy or sick.  Thus the expected utility of an non-insured individual 
is, 
  ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( h y qU y U q u E − + − =
where q is the probability of being ill.  The expected utility of an insured individual is, 
                                   ) ( ) ( p y U u E − =
Which is the same regardless of health state assuming the insurance premium is 
actuarially fair.    I also assume a consumer is risk averse such that   and 
will therefore prefer fair insurance over no insurance.   
0 , 0 < ′ ′ > ′ U U
 
Therefore, a utility maximising consumer will purchase a level of insurance that 
maximises his or her utility based on consumption, income, expected health expenditure, 
insurance premium and risk aversion level.   
5.1  The Reduced Form Model 
The reduced form version of the above utility maximisation problem is necessarily 
limited by data availability.  Measures of medical consumption, health care expenditure 
and price are unavailable here.  As no premium (price) information is available, I cannot 
infer price responses.  Currently, no panel data sets in Australia contain both price and 
income information.   
 
The choice to insure will be considered through a latent variable framework with a binary 
dependent variable (the consumer is either covered or not covered).  To account for this 
discrete choice a probit model will be used, with the underlying assumption of an 
asymptotic normal distribution.      
 
 
Further, as the data is in panel form, specification of the stochastic distribution is 
important.  The stochastic term in this study is assumed to follow a random effects 
specification over a fixed effects specification.  As the panel is a short, wide panel (small 
fixed T, large N) random effect specification will give asymptotically consistent 
parameter estimates (Kennedy, 2003).  Secondly, the fixed effects specification does not 
allow measurement of time invariant characteristics (such as country of birth) which 
could be of interest here (Greene, 2003, p 303).   The main shortcoming of the random 
effects specification - the unobservable person specific error - must be uncorrelated with 
the exogenous variables.  This is explicitly dealt with below.   
 
Finally, as persistence in choice and churning behaviours are important the probit is 
assumed to be dynamic, following a first-order Markov process, where only the most 
recent information – the last period’s choice – is relevant.  This is commonly referred to 
as state dependence – where the state of choice last period affects the state of choice this 
period.  As dynamic, random effects probit models are relatively new to the econometrics 
literature it is worthwhile to provide details on any deviations from a static, random 
effects probit model.  This is done below.   
5.2  A Random Effects Probit Model  
The choice to insure will be captured here through the following latent dependent 
variable framework,  
i 1
* T 2,...,      t N 1,2,..., i         , = = + ′ + ′ = − it t i it it PHI PHI u β X γ                   (5.01) 
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where the dependent variable is estimated using a latent variable   which measures 
the propensity to purchase private hospital cover.  Unless stated otherwise, this 




it =1) will only be observed when the latent variable crosses a given 
threshold, , otherwise it is unobservable.  The observable, exogenous variables 
that affect insurance choice are measured by the vector X
0
* > it PHI
it.  The state dependence effect, 
PHIi,t-1 is a lag of the dependent variable capturing persistence in choice. The error term, 
uit is a composite error term and is explained further in section 5.2.1 below.   The model 
will be estimated using an unbalanced panel so the final time period, Ti, will differ across 
individuals.  I will assume the conditional distribution of PHIit is correctly specified as, 
i 1 T 2,...,        t  N 1,2,...,     i              ) ; , , | ( = = − θ X it it it it t u PHI PHI f                (5.02) 
where θ is the vector of parameters to be specified.   
 
The addition of the state dependence variable will violate the normal (static) random 
effects assumption of strict exogeneity of regressor variables.  Under a static random 
effects probit the latent variable framework is, 
i
* T 2,...,      t N 1,2,..., i         = = + ′ = it it it u PHI β X                                      (5.03)  
 
where the regressor vector Xit is assumed to be strictly exogenous – it does not contain 
and leads or lags of the dependant variable.   The conditional density of the dependant 
variable  under the static random effects probit is,  ) ,..., ( 1 iT i PHI PHI
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Here the composite error term, uit, is assumed to be a random variable that is uncorrelated 
with all variables in the vector Xit.   
5.2.1  Stochastic Specification 
Under a random effects probit model, the composite error uit is broken down in the 
following manner, 
                                                                                        (5.04)  it i it a u ε + =
Where a is an individual-specific, time-constant random error and ε i it is a time-varying, 
individual specific random error.   However, specification of the unobserved individual-
specific ai is random under the static probit but specified under the dynamic probit. I will 
specify the static assumptions before describing the dynamic specification, where the 
following is proposed in Greene (2003).  The first assumption is the independence of  ai 
and εit such that, 
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Second, distribution of the two components is given by,  
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Third, using the previous assumptions, the composite error uit is assumed to have the 
following relationship with the exogenous variables, 
                             (5.08) 



















it is it u u Corr X                                  (5.09) 
where ρ captures the increases in total unexplained variance due to unobserved individual 
effects.  Equation (5.08) also indicates the exogenous variables are orthogonal to the 
composite error term – which again will be violated by the state dependence variable. 
5.2.2  Heterogeneity 
Unobserved heterogeneity (captured by ai) is likely to be correlated with the explanatory 
variables across time periods, either through the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, 
or through time varying Xit’s.  As mentioned, a fixed effects specification would directly 
model this correlation but the random effects specification does not. Methods for  
 
accounting for unobservable heterogeneity differ amongst the literature.  This study will 
follow the adapted Wooldridge (2005) approach as used by Contoyannis, Jones and Rice 
(2004) and originally specified by Mundlak (1978).  Equation (5.10) indicates the 
unobservable individual effects, ai, and the exogenous variables are related in a linear 
manner, 
i i i a η α + + = X α1 0                                                                         (5.10) 
i X is a vector of means of any time-varying regressors and η Where  i is the error term 
with the following distribution, 
                                ) , 0 ( ~
2
η σ η N i
i X The  vector now explicitly controls for the unobserved heterogeneity in a linear 
manner.  One downfall with the i X vector used in this model is the loss of accuracy as 
some variables (such as income) are not measured in the first wave so the mean will only 
measure changes in waves two and three.   Chamberlain (1984) allowed a more general 
form of the relationship in (5.10).  Under Chamberlain’s model, unobservable 
heterogeneity is specifically correlated with the regressors by using the values of the 




it i a η α + + = ∑
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1 0 X α                                                                           (5.11) 
This is potentially more efficient, but computation time was prohibitively high for this 
study.  The specification in (5.11) also does not allow for correlation between ai and time 
constant variables in the X vector.    i
The above results apply in the static case.  Equation (5.10) needs to be modified to 
include persistence effects before the unobservable heterogeneity is correctly specified in 
the dynamic context.     
5.2.3  State Dependence 
 in (5.1) violates the strict exogeneity assumption such that,   Clearly, PHIi,t-1
0 ] , , [        0 ] , [ 1 ≠ = − t i it it it PHI Cov Cov u X u                                        (5.12) 
Therefore specification of the error terms must be explicit for the dynamic model.    The 
decision to model state dependence with a lagged dependant variable follows Wooldridge 
(2005), Contoyannis et al. (2004) and Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000), however, 
alternative methods have been proposed.   An alternative model proposed by 
Chamberlain (1984) specifies state dependence with leads and lags of strictly exogenous 
variables thus not violating the assumption of  0 ) , ( = i it a Cov X  where PHIi,t-1 would.  The 
justification for the Chamberlain model - misspecification using strictly exogenous 
variables would result in estimates that were inefficient but still consistent.   However, as 
Erdem and Sun (2001) note, further distinctions cannot be made about different forms of 
state dependence, heterogeneity and serial correlation under Chamberlain’s model.   
Therefore, state dependence here will be specifically captured by a lagged dependent 
variable.     
 
5.2.4  Serial Correlation 
In the dynamic model, serial correlation in the composite error is captured by ρ if εit (in 
5.04) still has a standard normal distribution with a variance of one.  However, as the 
panel data contains a time series component the variance of εit could potentially exhibit 
some type of serial correlation such as an autoregressive [AR(1)] process.  While this is a 
potentially important source of persistence, our ability to test for it in the ALSWH data 
set is limited.  To separate autoregressive effects from serial correlation effects, one 
would need to determine the weight given to time-varying errors by distance.   
Specifically, test if  
                                                             (5.13)  ] , [ ] , , [ , l t i it k t i it Cov Cov + + > ε ε ε ε
where k < l.  As the ALSWH data set contains three waves, with only two used in the 
final model, testing for the distance effect is unfeasible.  An important extension to this 
study will come with further waves of ALSWH data and ability to specify possible serial 
correlation in the time varying error.   
5.2.5  Initial Conditions 
Persistence in a short panel like the ALSWH leads to an initial condition problem as 
PHIi0, the beginning of the insurance experience is omitted (the first wave is lost in the 
lag).   This problem is present in all dynamic random effects models where initial choice 
is lost because of a lagged dependent variable.  As Wooldridge (2005) notes, initial 
conditions in nonlinear models are more difficult than initial conditions in linear models.  
Linear models may be solved using a non-parametric instrumental variables or 
generalised method of moments framework, but are unusable here.  Wooldridge proposes 
a parametric approach which has its basis in Hsiao (1986).  If the initial condition is 
treated as a non-random variable for each cross-sectional unit, PHIi0 is implied to be 
independent of the unobservable heterogeneity, ai.  As established above, independence 
of ai and the regressors is unlikely.  However, if the initial conditions are treated as 
random this is no longer a problem, but this involves making a distributional assumption 
about PHIi0.  Specifically, Wooldridge models the distribution of the unobserved effect as 
conditional on the initial value, and any exogenous explanatory variables (including, for 
the purposes of this study, the vector of means),  
) ( ~ , | 0 2 1 0 0 i i i i i i PHI N PHI a η α α + ′ + + X α X                                   (5.14) 
To illustrate, PHIi0 now captures long-term holders of private health insurance who 
purchased prior to the financial incentives, an essential part of this analysis.  Equation 
(5.14) leads to a modification of equation (5.10) where the initial conditions are added 
and the assumptions about ηi still hold, 
i i i i PHI a η α α + ′ + + = 0 2 1 0 X α                                                             (5.15) 
Now the conditional distribution of η is,  i
) , 0 ( ~ , |
2
0 η σ η N PHI i i i X                                                                     (5.16) 
  
 
5.2.6  The Final Dynamic Specification 
Substituting equation (5.15) into equation (5.01) leads to the final latent variable 
specification, 
T 2,...,     t N 1,2,..., i
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) 1 , 0 ( ~ , ,..., , | 0 1 , N PHI PHI i i t i i it η ε − X where .  The density of (5.17) is assumed to be 
correctly identified by, 
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Estimation of the parameters in (5.17) involves maximising (5.18).  Following 
Wooldridge (2005), I integrate (5.18) conditional on the density in (5.15) to get the 
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N The conditional maximum likelihood estimates from (5.19) are  -consistent and 
asymptotically normal under standard regularity conditions, assuming that the moments 
exist and are finite (Wooldridge, 2002, p 495).  My final model specification allows me 
to separate and test for state dependence as the unobservable heterogeneity has been 
explicitly specified.  The simple test has the null hypothesis, 0 : 0 = γ H , against the 
alternative state dependence does matter.     
 
The integral in (5.19) is approximated by the Gauss-Hermite quadrature in Stata 9.1©.  
The applicability of the Gauss-Hermite quadrature was tested and error values for the 
specification in (5.17) were low.   Specifically, use of the default 12 quadrature points 
produced results that changed little with the addition of further quadrature points.  The 
final reduced form model (5.17) is estimated using the variables defined in Appendix 1.    
5.3  Average Partial Effects 
Estimation of the magnitude of the effects of the regressors cannot be directly inferred 
from (5.17).  Instead Wooldridge (2005) and Contoyannis et al., (2006) use average 
partial effects (APE’s) instead of marginal effects.  Unfortunately, the magnitude of time 
constant variables cannot be estimated with APE’s because of previous conditioning on 
the  i X vector.  The partial effects are average partial effects because the distribution of 
interest is the expected distribution, 
)] ( [ 1 i it it a PHI E + + Φ − γ β X                                                                       (5.20)  
 
The expectation is with respect to the distribution of the unobservable heterogeneity ai.  
Again using the linear specification in (5.15), the expectation becomes, 
] , | ) ( [ {
)] ( [
0 0 2 1 0 1
0 2 1 0 1
i i i i i it it
i i i it it
PHI PHI PHI E E
PHI PHI E
X X α β X
X α β X
η α α γ
η α α γ
+ ′ + ′ + + + Φ =
+ ′ + + + + Φ
−
−        (5.21) 
Equation (5.21) like equation (5.15) is conditional over the distribution of 
, while X ) , , ( 0 i i i PHI η X it, and PHIi,t-1 are fixed values, chosen for interest.  A consistent 
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The η subscript indicates multiplication by .  To obtain the APE for a binary 
regressor, (15.22) would be estimated with and without the variable.  To obtain the APE 
for a continuous variable x
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5.4 Modelling  Issues 
Before the estimation results of (5.17) are discussed two other issues relating to the 
ALSWH data set should be mentioned.   
5.4.1  Missing Observations 
In any self-completed survey, reasons for missing observations must be examined.   
Missing data can be problematic as it decreases sample size and may result in bias if 
these observations are deleted.  Three variables are particularly problematic. Body Mass 
Index (BMI), measured as weight in kilograms divided by the square of height in metres, 
is missing in 2430 (8 percent) out of the unbalanced panel of 31,725 observations.  There 
are two primary reasons for missing BMI.  First women may have been reluctant to report 
their weight or may not have recently measured their weight, and second the composite 
measure of BMI requires both height and weight.  Any missing height or weight means a 
missing BMI.  Income, both personal and household, was not asked in the first wave of 
the data.  This means income information for 1996 is missing for every respondent, about 
12,956 observations.  Imputation of this data is a problem because it is neither missing at 
random, nor censored.   The variable measuring access to hospitals was also not part of 
the 1996 survey, although is an important predictor.   
 
For missing exogenous variables that were recorded in every year (like BMI), the 
modified zero-order method is used (Greene, 2003, p 60).  The missing value is replaced 
by a zero in the original variable.  A second dummy variable is then created equal to 1 
when the original variable is zero.    For exogenous variables that were not asked in the 
first wave, the zero-order method is in appropriate.  Therefore, the first wave of data is 
often not included in analysis – although any exceptions to this rule are clearly stated 
below.  While this looses valuable information from the first wave, 1996, it is at the least 
systematic and clear.  
 
5.4.2  Attrition 
Attrition has two main effects on any analysis of a panel data set (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, 
and Moffitt, 1998).  If the attrition is random then no estimation bias will be introduced, 
although inefficiency will increase.  If attrition is non-random then selection effects will 
cause bias in the coefficients as well as inefficiency.   
 
Attrition bias results if respondents drop out of the sample but will be ignorable if the loss 
of observations does not result in changes to the conditional distribution.  Although I use 
an unbalanced panel that accounts for attrition, comparison of the results from the 
dynamic probit model with a balanced and unbalanced panel (see appendix 3) indicates 
very similar results.  Both coefficients and standard errors are similar, with the balanced 
model giving less efficient estimates (indicated by an increase in the unexplained 
variance ).    a σ
 
Attrition between 1996 and 2000 is larger, but for the purposes of the dynamic model is 
unmeasurable due to the loss of the first period through a lagged dependent variable.    
Further research into dynamic choice models could look at ways to correct for this 




The benefits of dynamic modelling can be highlighted by comparing choice models in a 
cross-sectional context, a static panel context and a dynamic panel context.  A complete 
set of comparative results is provided in appendix 3. 
 
Models 1 to 3 of appendix 3 use a standard latent variable probit of the form,  
    N 1,2,..., i
   
*
=
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                                                                              (6.1) 
Under equation (6.1) choice varies over individuals but not over time.   Unobserved 
individual specific effects are considered random variables in this specification.   
 
Model 4 of appendix 3 uses a latent variable, random effect probit of the form, 
T 2,...,      t  N 1,2,...,     i
*
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                                                                     (6.2) 
Under equation (6.2) choice varies over individual and over time. As income, self-
reported hospital access and other key variables are unasked in the 1996 survey, only two 
time periods are included in the static random effects probit.  The loss of information is 
considered a reasonable trade-off for well specified estimation.  The unobserved 
individual specific effect, a, as part of the composite error term, u i it, is considered random 
and uncorrelated with the Xit vector in this specification.   
 
Model 5 uses a slight variation of the static random effects probit by including the linear 
specification in equation (5.10),  
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                                                           (6.3) 
Under equation (6.3) choice again varies over individual and over time, and again only 
includes waves 2 and 3.  The unobserved individual specific effect, ai, has the linear 
relationship the .    i X
 
Models 6 and 7 of appendix 3 use the dynamic random effect probit specified in equation 
(5.17) above, which is repeated below for convenience,  
T 2,...,     t N 1,2,..., i
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             (6.4) 
Model 6 uses an unbalanced panel and model 7 uses a balanced panel.  I have not 
reported the results for the vector of means for models 5 and 6, however identical vectors 
were included in both.  As the panel is a short, wide panel, a set of time dummies is 
needed – therefore a dummy for the year 2000 is included (Wooldridge 2002, p 484) in 
all the random effects probit models.    
 
Model fit measures that could be comparable across all the above specifications are 
relatively few.  As dynamic, discrete choice models are relatively new few diagnostic 
tests have been designed.  Comparison on the basis of log likelihood is difficult because 
almost every model uses a different underlying sample.    However, comparison of model 
4 and model 6 is clearer as both use the second and third waves.  Inclusion of the 
dynamic specification increases the log likelihood in model 6.  A log likelihood ratio test 
of the unrestricted model 6 against the restricted model 4, gives a test statistic of 2149.6.  
At the 1 percent level the chi-squared statistic with 69 degrees of freedom is 50.89, so the 
null hypothesis that the extra specification in the dynamic model is zero would be 
strongly rejected.  A more casual measure of the model fit in model 6 is provided in 
predicted probabilities versus the sample probabilities in table 6.1 below.   
 
Table 6.1: Predicted versus Sample Proportions 
  Sample Proportions  Predicted Proportions 
0.34 0.32   = 1  PHIit
0.66 0.68  PHI  = 0  it
 
Table 6.2 below gives an indication of the differences in signs and significance of 
regressor variables across models.  The dynamic specification (model 6), with state 
dependence effects, changes many of the conclusions of the static and cross-sectional 
models – often giving insignificant coefficients.  Differences in conclusions give some 
indication of the dominance of dynamic modelling.  As the dynamic model separately 
controls for unobservable heterogeneity and state dependence effects, results are more 
robust than models 1 to 4 in table 6.2 and 1 to 5 in the complete appendix 3. 
  
 
It should be noted that direct comparisons would be more ideal if the static random 
effects probit could contain 1996, 2000 and 2003, as specification of initial conditions 
should make the two period dynamic model comparable to the three period static.  
 
Table 6.2: Summarised Set of Comparative Results 









(4)  (6) 
Static Random  Dynamic Random 
Effects Probit  Effects Probit 
Log L  -7387  -5396 -4632 -8948  -7874 
N  14,070  9,528  7,743  17,271  17,271 
1  1  1  2  2  T 
error σ ˆ       1.58 (sig.)  0.59 (sig.)   
ρ ˆ -- --  --  0.7  0.25   
γˆ --  -- -- --  1.12  (sig.)   
2 ˆ α --  -- -- --  0.46  (sig.)   
2000 ˆ
Y β --  --  --  -0.368 (sig.)  -0.315 (sig.) 
 
Employed (-)  Employed (+) 
Tertiary (+) 





















Tertiary (-)  Tertiary (+)  Tertiary (+)  Tertiary (-) 
Live alone (-) 
Live alone (-)  Live alone (-)  Live alone (-)  Live alone (-) 
Health card (-) 
Health card (-)  Health card (-)  Health card (-)  Health card - not sig. 
Smoking – not sig.  Smoking (-)  Smoking (-)  Smoking (-)   Smoking - not sig. 









Cancer (-)  Endometriosis (-)   Endometriosis (-)  Endometriosis (-)  Cancer (-) 
Cancer (-)   
















Pregnant (-)   Pregnant – not sig.  Pregnant (+)   Pregnant (+)  Pregnant (+) 
Want children (+)   Want children (+)  Want child (+)  Want child (+)  Want child - not sig. 





















Born in Asia (+)  Born in Asia – not 
sig. 
Born in Asia – not 
sig. 
Born in Asia – not 
sig.  
Born in Asia (+) 
  
 
6.1  State Dependence Effects  
The results in table 6.2 clearly indicate state dependence has a significant effect on the 
choice to purchase private hospital insurance.  There is also evidence to show not 
controlling for state dependence can cause an omitted variable bias and inflate the 
variance of the stochastic term.  The coefficient ρ ˆ   as specified in equation (5.09) 
measures the increase in unexplained variance due to ai, the individual specific error.   
Under a static random effects probit specification (model 4) ρ ˆ  is 0.7 indicating 70 
percent of the unexplained variance is due to ai, the unobserved individual specific effect.  
Under a dynamic random effect probit specification ρ ˆ  decreases to 0.25 indicating a 0.45 
decrease in unexplained variance.  Therefore, the linear specification for ai does decrease 
the variance caused by unobserved individual specific effects.   This is reflected in the 
larger unexplained variance, error σ ˆ , of 1.58 for model 4 compared to 0.59 for model 6.   
 
γˆ State dependence, as measured by   has a positive and highly significant effect on the 
choice to insure.   This indicates significant inertia in the choice, even after controlling 
for unobservable heterogeneity.    Controlling for initial conditions is also important as 
indicated by the positive and highly significant 2 ˆ α , again indicating women currently 
insured are most likely to be women insured for a long period of time.   Further 
justification for the proposed linear specification for unobserved effects in (5.10) is 
provided by a chi-squared joint test of the  it X vector.  Under a null hypothesis of all 
coefficients in the  it X  being zero, a chi-squared statistic (with 67 degrees of freedom) of 
202.98 is generated.  This gives a p-value of less than 0.0001 and indicates the null would 
be strongly rejected.  Therefore,   is an important control.  it X
 
Finally, the coefficient    is negative and highly significant.  This reinforces the 
conclusions from table 4.1 which indicated the percent insured increased over the three 
waves.  To some extent, a negative    indicates effectiveness of government 
inducements as women were still more likely to purchase in 2003 after controlling for a 






The importance of state dependence effects has significant ramifications for all other 
model specifications.  Modelling without a lagged dependant variable can lead to an 
omitted variable bias, which can often change the signs and significance of the socio-
economic variables.  The effect of this bias in the context of cross-model comparisons 
will be discussed below.   
6.2  Adverse Selection Effects 
The risk profile of the insured pool is important.  Generally, insured women of the 
ALSWH sample were no less healthy, and no more risky than the non-insured pool.   
 
Considering risk variables, nicotine and alcohol consumption were insignificant 
determinants in the dynamic model.  Nicotine consumption (usually significantly 
negatively related to insurance purchase) was negative but insignificant in the dynamic  
 
model but had the expected negative and significant coefficient in all other specifications.  
Similarly, women who consume risky amounts of alcohol are less likely to purchase but 
the result is insignificant.  The expected negative and significant coefficient on risky 
drinkers is only present in the static model (model 4).   The insignificant dynamic results 
could mean nicotine and alcohol are not the significant risk measures that previous 
empirical studies would suggest.  Body mass index (BMI) results are also inconclusive as 
the coefficient on BMI is positive but insignificant in the panel model.  However, levels 
of physical activity had the expected coefficients and this group of dummy variables was 
the only indication higher risk women would purchase private cover.  Using sedentary 
(no exercise) as the base category, women who engaged in any physical activity were less 
likely to purchase insurance than the base.  This held over all specifications, indicating 
exercise could be a good indicator of future risk as women without insurance engage in 
risk reducing activities.   
 
Considering health variables, self-assessed health and chronic condition variables gave 
expected signs but were generally insignificant in the dynamic model.  Only women with 
very good or good self-reported health were significantly less likely to purchase than the 
base group of excellent in the dynamic model (joint p-value of self-assessed health 
dummies is 0.1466).  Women with fair self-reported health were also significantly less 
likely to purchase in the static model.  As shown in appendix 6, the surprise is women 
with poor self-reported health who are more likely to purchase insurance than the base 
although the coefficient is insignificant.  This is contrary to the result in Doiron et al., 
(2006), indicating self-assessed health does reflect some type of underlying heterogeneity 
which can be controlled for with a panel model.  This is also confirmed by models 1 and 
3 where the cross-sectional results correspond with the Doiron et al. (2006) results.  The 
two scale measures from the SF-36 Health Survey were insignificant in all specifications 
although this is not entirely unexpected as women of this age group would be expected to 
have few health shocks [see Mishra and Schofield (1998) for further details on SF-36 
distributions].   
 
Of the long-term conditions, only cancer was a significant and positive predictor of 
purchase in the dynamic model.  In the other model specifications endometriosis was 
consistently a positive and significant predictor although became insignificant in the 
dynamic model.  This is consistent with expected usage as cancer patients are likely to 
require regular and long-term hospital visits compared to conditions such as asthma 
which could become manageable with correct medications. Long-term conditions may 
not be significant in the modelling here for two reasons.  First, this age group has a 
relatively low prevalence of chronic conditions – table 4.3 shows that bar asthma, women 
with a certain chronic condition compose at most 2 percent of either the insured or 
uninsured pool. Second, the panel is relatively short so working out causality in choice is 
unlikely.    
 
It can be concluded that the prevalence of adverse selection - as measured by chronic 
conditions, self-assessed health, and risk measures – is low in this age group of women.  
6.3 Socio-Economic  Determinants 
Socio-economic determinants are broadly less significant in the dynamic model than in 
other model specifications – with income the notable exception.  Personal income is  
 
jointly significant across all models (joint p-value of less than 0.0001) although the 
separate categories differed in significance across specifications.  Using INC3 as the base 
level ($120-$299 per week), women with income between $300 and $999 per week were 
less likely to purchase insurance.  Women with income between $0 and $299 per week 
and women with income $1000 to $1499 per week were more likely to purchase (this is 
shown graphically in appendix 4).  Finding women with low income to be more likely to 
purchase is surprising and contradicts previous findings of a positive relationship between 
personal income and private health insurance. However, low income level categories 
(INC1-INC4) are insignificant in dynamic model specifications indicating these effects 
are imprecisely estimating a zero difference with the base.    Finding women with income 
levels higher than $120-$299 per week less likely to purchase is also contrary to the 
expected positive relationship between income and insurance.  Unlike the lower income 
levels, the coefficients on income between $500-$999 per week were significant and 
negative.  This relationship also appears in the average partial effects indicating women 
in the middle income bands of $500-$999 per week are overall less likely to purchase that 
other women.  As the Medicare Levy cuts in at a gross income level of $950 per week, 
some women in the $700-$999 income category should be purchasing purely for tax 
reasons.  This could indicate women in this sample are unaware of the Medicare Levy 
effects.   
 
Household income is uniformly significant across specifications, at the individual income 
category level and jointly (joint p-value 0.0126).   Using the highest income category 
(INC8 - $1500 plus per week) all income categories below were less likely to purchase 
(this is shown graphically in appendix 5).  Also, women who lived alone (and had only 
one source of household income) were significantly less likely to purchase insurance and 
this held over all model specifications.  This is consistent with families buying insurance 
as a single income unit due to extra income and extra expected usage.     
 
Being employed had a positive effect on insurance purchase in all models bar model 1 
(1996).  This result was only significant in the model 4 (static, no means vector) and 
model 2 (2000), although had had a low p-value (0.10) in the dynamic model.  This could 
indicate employment effects such as income and education may be captured already.   
 
The presence of a health care card was a negative and significant predictor in all other 
specifications bar the dynamic model.  The coefficient in the dynamic model was still 
negative but was insignificant with a p-value of 0.135.  While women in receipt of 
government benefits (of which health care card is a proxy) are a priori less likely to 
purchase insurance, this effect is also likely to be captured in income and education.   
 
Women with high school education or lower are used as the base category for the 
education/qualification categories.  Across all panel models women with a diploma or 
other qualification were not significantly different to women with high school education 
(the only exception being women with a diploma in model 4).  The cross-sectional 
models indicated similar results.  This indicates differences in learning and information 
among these categories does not affect the health insurance choice.  Conversely, women 
with tertiary education were significantly different from the other categories.  In models 2 
to 5, tertiary eduction increases the likelihood of purchase.  However, both dynamic 
specifications (balanced and unbalanced) indicated women with tertiary education were 
less likely to purchase insurance than the base group – women with high school  
 
education. This contradicts previous findings that indicate education has a positive effect 
on the decision to insure.  It could indicate two conclusions.  Firstly, tertiary education 
could be correlated with a lower risk or risk aversion profile – possibly indicating a large 
number of tertiary educated women are still students at the time of survey.    Secondly, 
the dynamic specification may be controlling for increases in tertiary education levels 
over time which would have given the positive result in other specifications.  Either 
option makes the ALSWH an interesting sample to study, as informed consumers may 
not be high purchasers of private cover as previously thought.   
 
As expected, age is a positive driver of insurance coverage across all panel models.   
However, its effect is often insignificant - in model 1 (1996) and model 2 (2000) age has 
a negative effect in 2000 and 1996, indicating omitted variable bias.  This positive result 
is consistent with women moving into cover on as the threshold age of 30 (Lifetime 
Health Cover) is reached.  Most of the age effect is captured in the year dummy.     
 
Family formation is an important determinant in the insurance decisions as women with 
partners are a priori expected to have a higher income base and be more likely to save for 
the future.  Here single women are the base group.  Married women are more likely to 
purchase insurance than the base and this holds uniformly over the models, bar women in 
a de facto relationship who are less likely to purchase in the cross-section models and 
static models.    Again the co-efficient on de facto relationships is positive (but 
insignificant) in the dynamic model, indicating the counterintuitive cross-section and 
static results are biased.  Interestingly the separated/divorced/widowed women are 
significantly more likely to purchase in the dynamic model, but have an insignificant 
effect in almost all other models.   This result is expected as these women could have 
purchased as one half of a partnership before becoming separated/divorced/widowed, so 
it is surprising it was only picked up the dynamic model.   
 
Child rearing is also an integral part of family formation and is an empirically important 
determinant in the decision to purchase insurance.  Pregnancy and child birth come with 
an expected high hospital cost although health fund waiting lists for these services can be 
long so forward planning is needed.   While being currently pregnant has a positive but 
insignificant effect of choice, being pregnant in the past 12 months has a positive and 
very significant (p-value 0.023) effect on insurance choice.  Women who expected to 
have at least one child by 35 were significantly more likely to purchase insurance than 
women who did not want children in all models bar the dynamic.  Finally, if the woman 
was a mother she was significantly less likely to purchase insurance than women without 
children in models 1 to 5.  Again this effect drops out in the dynamic model - while the 
coefficient is still negative, it is insignificant.   These results seem to reflect two results 
for child rearing.  First, for women who do not plan ahead for pregnancies, waiting list 
times are prohibitively long or lead to insurance only after the child is born.  Second, for 
mothers in the 18-30 age group, private health insurance is not worth the extra cost over 
and above the public system.   
 
While area of residence can be an important indicator of socio-economic status, it can 
also be an important indictor of access to health care services – yet often the two effects 
cannot be separated.  Fortunately, the ALSWH data set contains both measures.   Not 
surprisingly, women who rated access to a hospital as ‘excellent’ or ‘very good’ were 
significantly more likely to purchase private hospital insurance than women who rated  
 
access ‘good’, ‘fair’ or ‘poor’.  Importantly, this result held over all models after 
controlling for location variables – indicating inequality of access is not confined to 
urban-rural differences or state differences.  These results show that a woman’s 
perception of access to hospital is a strong separate determinant of the choice to insure.  
 
Area variables are also significant, with women in rural and remote areas less likely to 
purchase insurance than women in urban areas – and this is consistent with previous 
empirical results.   This could indicate lower availability on information about insurance 
in non-urban areas or a lower degree of access to out-patient specialist services (not 
captured in the access variables) that could also be covered by private health insurance.    
With New South Wales as the base state for area of residence, all states bar the Australian 
Capital Territory were less likely to purchase.  This result was significant for Victoria, 
Queensland and South Australia, indicating historical differences in coverage levels or 
lower access to some services in these states.    These results have significant 
implications for policy makers as increasing hospital availability may be the catalyst for 
greater take up of private cover, rather than the opposite view of increasing private cover 
to decrease hospital strain.   
 
As expected, women born in Australia are more likely to purchase than women born 
overseas with one exception – women born in Asia are more likely to purchase than 
women born in Australia and the result is significant in the dynamic model.  Women born 
in other English speaking countries were significantly less likely to purchase than women 
born in Australia.  These results could point to cultural differences in attitudes to private 
health insurance, for example, women born in the United Kingdom are likely to have 
greater faith in a working public system due to high levels of public cover there.  Women 
in Asia may have opposite preconceived notions due to low levels of public insurance in 
some Asian nations.  Again, this makes the ALSWH a more interesting sample to study.   
 
Overall, the dynamic specification reduces the statistical significance of many variables, 
often those normally found to be very significant drivers of insurance purchase.  For 
young women in Australia, the choice to privately insure is based on income, access and 
inertia.   
6.4  Average Partial Effects 
Using the consistent estimator in equation (5.17), the average partial effects can be 
estimated using fixed values of Xit,  PHIi,t-1.  One issue prevents full analysis.  The 
difference in questions for the 1996 survey mean partial effects of variables such as 
income cannot span all three years.  To ensure consistent treatment, the partial effects 
will be averaged over 2000 and 2003.  While this means loss of information from 1996, 
the alternative - averaging over the three waves for some variables but not others - seems 
less justifiable.  For relevance, the base probability here is designed to represent a typical 
women in the ALSWH data set.  A woman representing a base individual would:  
o  be 23 years of age;  
o  have a personal income of $500-$699 per week; 
o  have a household income of $1500 or more per week; 
o  be single; 
o  like to have at least one child by the age of 35; 
o  live in New South Wales;  
 
o  live in an urban area; 
o  have secondary school (or lower) qualifications; 
o  be in very good self-reported health; 
o  have average SF-36 scores (Physical Component Score of 50, Mental Component 
Score of 50);  
o  have a BMI of 22; 
o  engage in a low level of exercise; 
o  be born in Australia; 
o  be employed; 
o  have excellent or very good access to a hospital. 
 
This represents the first probability in the left hand column of table 6.3.  A woman with 
these base characteristics, who did not hold insurance in 2000, has a 0.36 probability of 
purchasing insurance in 2003.  The same representative women that did hold insurance in 
2000 has a 0.77 probability of purchase in 2003.   
 










Base Probability of Purchase in 2003 0.357 0.767
Age --  23 to 30 0.453 0.10 0.835 0.07
BMI -- 22 to 30 0.390 0.03 0.792 0.02
Income -- Women with more than one person in 
household to women who live alone 0.267 -0.09 0.683 -0.08
Self-assessed health -- Very Good to Excellent 0.406 0.05 0.804 0.04
Marital status -- Single to married  0.476 0.12 0.849 0.08
Children -- None to one or more 0.336 -0.02 0.749 -0.02
Children and Married -- None to one or more 0.453 0.10 0.835 0.07
Location -- Urban to rural 0.304 -0.05 0.721 -0.05
Education -- Only school to tertiary 0.289 -0.07 0.705 -0.06
Access level -- Level 1 to level 3 0.206 -0.15 0.610 -0.16
Exercise level -- Low exercise to high exercise 0.376 0.02 0.782 0.01
Smoking -- Non-smoker to regular smoker 0.322 -0.04 0.737 -0.03
Alcohol -- Non-risky drinker to risky drinker 0.352 -0.01 0.763 0.00 
 
Immediately apparent in table 6.3 is the large effect of state dependence on the 
probability of purchase.  A woman who had insurance in 2000 has no predicted 
probabilities less than 0.5 despite a wide range of changes to the base personal 
characteristics.     This indicates state dependence has a statistically and economically 
significant effect on the choice to insure.   
 
Examining changes from the base characteristics provides other interesting results.  An 
increase in age increases the probability of purchase whether a woman is insured or not.  
Similar increases result from increased BMI, increased self-assessed health, a change 
from single to married, changing to married with children and increases in amount of 
exercise.  The largest increase - a probability increase of 0.12 when not insured in 2000 
and 0.08 when insured in 2000 - results from a woman becoming married with children.   
 
This indicates family formation does have an economically significant effect on the 
choice to insure.   
 
Changing from a woman living in a multiple person household to living alone decreases 
the probability of purchase by 0.09 (not insured in 2000) or 0.08 (when insured in 2000), 
again indicating the choice to insure is highly related to partnership and the increased 
income partnership brings with it.  A change to having children; living in a rural area; 
having tertiary education; having lower levels of hospital access; being a regular smoker; 
and a riskier drinker all decrease the probability of purchase.  The biggest decrease in 
probability results from changing the level of hospital access from level 1 (‘excellent’ or 
‘very good’) to level 3 (‘fair’ or ‘poor’).  This decreases probability of purchase by 0.15 
for women without insurance in 2000 and 0.16 for a woman with insurance in 2000.   
 
Personal income, household income and age can be decomposed further.  Figure 6.1 
indicates the probability of insurance purchase increases with increases in personal 
income although the effect is not linear.  Women with a personal income of $1000 per 
week or more, who did not have insurance in 2000, have a greater than 0.5 probability of 
purchasing insurance.  These women would be exempt from the Medicare Levy if they 
purchased insurance so this result is unsurprising.  Women who were insured in 2000 
were consistently more likely than not to have insurance in 20003.  One anomaly is the 
dip in probabilities for middle income women – indicating the absence of tax breaks for 
this group cause an economically significant decrease in coverage levels.   
 
Figure 6.1: Personal Income 
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Figure 6.2 indicates household income generally has the expected upward effect on 
probabilities.  Average partial effects are slightly more difficult to calculate for household 
than personal income.  The probabilities in figure 6.2 are calculated with personal income 
fixed at $1-$199 per week – so household income is only estimated from $1-$199 
upwards as it would make little sense for personal income to be greater than household 
income.  Again, this effect is different for women who held insurance in 2000 to non-
insured women.  If a woman did not have insurance in 2000 but had the highest level of 
household income ($1500 of more per week) the probability of purchase would still only  
 
be 0.46, where as a women who had insurance in 2000 always has a probability of 
purchase greater than 0.5, regardless of household income level. 
Figure 6.2: Household Income 




































The probability of purchase also increases with age, this time in a linear manner.  Again, 
state dependence is indicated by an upward shift of about 0.4 in probability of purchase 
from women who did not have insurance in 2000 to women who did have insurance in 
2000.     
 
Figure 6.3: Age  




























Finally, the probability of purchase is greater in 2003 than in 2000, which supports an 
increase in insurance uptake with changes to government incentives.  Specifically, the 
probability of purchase in 2002 is 0.25 if a woman did not hold insurance in 1996.  This 
probability increased to 0.66 if a woman did hold insurance in 1996.   
 
 
7  CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
7.1 Conclusions 
The choice to purchase private hospital insurance in Australia is a dynamic one for 
women under the age of 30.  Using a dynamic, random effects probit, I show this choice 
is strongly driven by inertia, income, and access levels.    This would indicate women 
with cover stay covered, and women without cover have little propensity to purchase 
cover.  To a smaller extent, the choice is related to family formation, education, exercise 
levels, and self-assessed health.   I have also shown dynamic discrete choice modelling 
can give revealing insights into consumer behaviour and intertemporal preferences.    
 
The importance of persistence in choice has ramifications for the design of incentive 
policies that encourage uptake of private cover.  The economically and statistically large 
effect of last period choice indicates a market dominated by inertia.  If Australia did 
move to a managed competition framework as Scotton (1990) suggests, the significant 
inertia in the market could hinder the normal efficiency effects from rational and mobile 
consumers.  This conclusion has limitations as switching between funds cannot be 
measured here, but measuring inertia in choice of fund could be an interesting area of 
future research.   
 
Other policy consequences result from possible inequity issues as women with higher 
income, higher levels of self-reported access, and continued cover get discounted 
insurance premiums and tax breaks.  These women also appear to be in similar levels of 
health to those without insurance, indicating their move to the private system may not 
reduce costs in the public system.  However, if women with private cover are more likely 
to have (among other attributes) higher incomes, better self-reported health and better 
hospital access there is no definitive evidence in this data set to link private hospital cover 
and use of the private hospital system.    Consequently, I cannot definitively conclude 
government incentive policies have helped or hindered the public health system.       
However, I can conclude the insured pool in this age group show little indication of 
adverse selection effects.  Rather, consumption of insurance seems to be more of a luxury 
good – where purchase is highly related to income and socio-economic status.   
 
As in any applied work, generality of conclusions are necessarily limited by the available 
data.    While comparisons to the Australian population indicate women in the ALSWH 
sample have higher than expected levels of private hospital insurance, this study still 
provides a valuable insight into women of this age group.   
7.2 Extensions 
Dynamic discrete choice modelling is still in its infancy.  Further extensions into the area 
should include construction of robust diagnostic tests, methods for accounting for serial 
correlation in time-varying errors, and further exploration into possible specifications of 
the individual effects.  While a linear relationship is specified here, other non-linear 
relationships could be explored.    Particular extensions to this study could include use of 
Chamberlain’s (1984) more general specification for the unobserved individual specific  
 
effects.  Also, with a greater number of survey waves, testing and correction for possible 
autocorrelation in the time-varying errors could be done using Stewart’s (2006) 
specification.   
 
Doctor and specialist use variables have not been included in this study either, although 
were some were available in the data set.  This is mainly due to the difficulty in 
correcting for endogenous variables in dynamic random effects probit models.   
 
Finally, use of older cohorts in the ALSWH data set would provide useful information 
about risk pooling, inertia in choice, and access across age groups.  Comparisons across 
these age groups might better reveal pooling effects in the private health insurance market 
as a whole.     
 
As Australian policy holders ponder the future of our private health care system, similar 
studies to the one provided here will allow further insights into intertemporal choice and 
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9.1  Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name  Definition 





= 1 if hold private hospital insurance in the current period, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if held private hospital insurance in the previous period, 0 otherwise 




= 1 if year is 2000, 0 otherwise  











= 1 if respondent earns no income, 0 otherwise  
= 1 if respondent earns $1-$199pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if respondent earns $120-$299pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if respondent earns $300-$499pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if respondent earns $500-$699pw, 0 otherwise  
= 1 if respondent earns $700-$999pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if respondent earns $1000-$1499pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if respondent earns $1500+ pw, 0 otherwise 













= 1 if household earns no income, 0 otherwise  
= 1 if household earns $1-$199pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if household earns $120-$299pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if household earns $300-$499pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if household earns $500-$699pw, 0 otherwise  
= 1 if household earns $700-$999pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if household earns $1000-$1499pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if household earns $1500+ pw, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if Missing/Don’t want to answer, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if respondent lives alone, 0 otherwise  
 
AGE  = Age of respondent (years) 
EMPLOYED  = 1 if employed, 0 otherwise 
  Qualifications 
TERTIARY  = 1 if completed tertiary qualifications, 0 otherwise 
DIPLOMA  = 1 if completed a diploma, 0 otherwise  
OTHERQUAL  = 1 if completed other qualifications, 0 otherwise 
ONLYSCHOOL  = 1 if only primary or secondary schooling, 0 otherwise 
QUALMISS  = 1 if qualification is missing, 0 otherwise 
  State 
NSW  = 1 if lives in New South Wales, 0 otherwise 
VIC  = 1 if lives in Victoria, 0 otherwise  
QLD  = 1 if lives in Queensland, 0 otherwise 
SA  = 1 if lives in South Australia, 0 otherwise 
WA  = 1 if lives in Western Australia, 0 otherwise 
TAS  = 1 if lives in Tasmania, 0 otherwise 
NT  = 1 if lives in Northern Territory, 0 otherwise 
ACT  = 1 if lives in Australian Capital Territory, 0 otherwise 
STATEMISS  = 1 if state of residence missing, 0 otherwise 
  Area  
URBAN   = 1 if lives in a major urban area, 0 otherwise 
RURAL  = 1 if lives in a rural area, 0 otherwise 
REMOTE  = 1 if lives in remote area, 0 otherwise 
AREAMISS  = 1 if area of residence is missing 
  Marital Status 
SINGLE 
NEVERMARR 
= 1 if single, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if never been married, 0 otherwise 
MARRIED 
= 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
SEPDIVWID 
= 1 if separated, divorced or widowed, 0 otherwise 
MARISTATMISS 










= 1 if has a child, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if pregnant in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if currently pregnant, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if want children by 35 years old, 0 otherwise 









= 1 if in excellent self-reported health, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if in very good self-reported health, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if in good self-reported health, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if in fair self-reported health, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if in poor self-reported health, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if self-reported health is missing, 0 otherwise 




= Mental health Component Scale, weighted for the Australian population 







= 1 if smoke daily, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if risky or high risk by NHMRC guidelines, 0 otherwise 
= body mass index (kilograms / metres
2) 







[as per National Health Foundation of Australia and Australian Institute of Health 
guidelines (1998)]  
= 1 if high exerciser, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if moderate exerciser, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if low exerciser, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if do not exercise or sedentary, 0 otherwise 





= 1 if have diabetes, 0 otherwise 







= 1 if have asthma, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if have endometriosis, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if have Hepatitis A of B, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if have cancer, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if have other serious illness, 0 otherwise 








= 1 if born in Australia, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if born in other English speaking background country, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if born in Europe, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if born in Asia, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if born in other non English speaking country, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if country of birth is missing, 0 otherwise 






= 1 if rate access to a hospital ‘Excellent’ or ‘Very Good’, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if rate access to a hospital  to be ‘Good’, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if rate access to a hospital to be ‘Fair’ or ‘Poor’, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if hospital access opinion is missing, 0 otherwise 
  
 











INC1 0.045 0.207 -- -- 0.038 0.191 0.054 0.226
INC2 0.070 0.254 -- -- 0.068 0.251 0.072 0.258
INC3* 0.132 0.339 -- -- 0.149 0.356 0.112 0.315
INC4 0.182 0.386 -- -- 0.213 0.409 0.144 0.351
INC5 0.240 0.427 -- -- 0.279 0.449 0.192 0.394
INC6 0.184 0.387 -- -- 0.142 0.349 0.236 0.425
INC7 0.061 0.240 -- -- 0.027 0.161 0.236 0.425
INC8 0.011 0.103 -- -- 0.003 0.056 0.020 0.140
INCMISS 0.075 0.263 -- -- 0.082 0.275 0.066 0.248
HINC1 0.004 0.063 -- -- 0.005 0.067 0.003 0.057
HINC2 0.004 0.064 -- -- 0.005 0.072 0.003 0.054
HINC3 0.018 0.134 -- -- 0.023 0.150 0.012 0.111
HINC4 0.051 0.219 -- -- 0.061 0.240 0.037 0.189
HINC5 0.095 0.293 -- -- 0.103 0.305 0.083 0.277
HINC6 0.142 0.349 -- -- 0.145 0.352 0.139 0.345
HINC7 0.187 0.390 -- -- 0.184 0.388 0.191 0.393
HINC8 0.216 0.412 -- -- 0.171 0.376 0.273 0.445
HINCMISS 0.228 0.420 -- -- 0.251 0.434 0.200 0.400
HINCALONE 0.055 0.227 -- -- 0.052 0.221 0.059 0.235
AGE 23.270 3.161 20.303 1.503 24.132 1.467 27.133 1.454
EMPLOYED 0.455 0.498 -- -- 0.805 0.396 0.776 0.417
TERTIARY 0.285 0.451 0.111 0.314 0.389 0.488 0.444 0.497
DIPLOMA 0.185 0.389 0.152 0.359 0.204 0.403 0.218 0.413
OTHERQUAL 0.029 0.168 0.027 0.162 0.030 0.171 0.031 0.174
ONLYSCHOOL* 0.482 0.500 0.704 0.457 0.341 0.474 0.284 0.451
QUALMISS 0.020 0.138 0.005 0.073 0.036 0.187 0.022 0.148
NSW* 0.280 0.449 0.289 0.453 0.278 0.448 0.265 0.441
VIC 0.261 0.439 0.256 0.436 0.264 0.441 0.264 0.441
QLD 0.214 0.410 0.215 0.411 0.213 0.409 0.214 0.410
SA 0.080 0.272 0.081 0.273 0.079 0.271 0.080 0.271
WA 0.094 0.292 0.095 0.293 0.095 0.294 0.094 0.291
TAS 0.035 0.184 0.036 0.185 0.037 0.189 0.032 0.177
NT 0.009 0.097 0.008 0.091 0.009 0.097 0.011 0.104
ACT 0.020 0.141 0.019 0.137 0.020 0.140 0.023 0.149
STATEMISS 0.006 0.079 0.001 0.029 0.004 0.066 0.018 0.132
URBAN* 0.561 0.496 0.551 0.497 0.548 0.498 0.590 0.492
RURAL 0.393 0.488 0.406 0.491 0.410 0.492 0.350 0.477
REMOTE 0.039 0.193 0.039 0.193 0.038 0.191 0.039 0.192
AREAMISS 0.008 0.089 0.003 0.051 0.004 0.066 0.021 0.144
SINGLE* 0.583 0.493 0.762 0.426 0.531 0.499 0.348 0.476
MARRIED 0.222 0.416 0.089 0.284 0.243 0.429 0.418 0.493
DEFACTO 0.173 0.378 0.135 0.342 0.206 0.405 0.196 0.397
SEPDIVWID 0.017 0.130 0.009 0.097 0.015 0.122 0.034 0.181
MARIMISS 0.005 0.068 0.005 0.070 0.005 0.071 0.004 0.061
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Total Sample
31341 14070 9528 7743
 













HAVECHILD 0.227 0.419 0.168 0.374 0.241 0.427 0.311 0.463
PREGLESS12 0.103 0.304 0.104 0.306 0.085 0.279 0.126 0.332
CURRPREG 0.059 0.236 0.046 0.209 0.050 0.219 0.094 0.292
CHILDREN35 0.849 0.358 0.774 0.418 0.903 0.296 0.907 0.290
HEALTHCARD 0.193 0.395 -- -- 0.214 0.410 0.167 0.373
SAHSEXC* 0.128 0.334 0.124 0.330 0.126 0.332 0.135 0.342
SAHSVGOOD 0.398 0.489 0.384 0.486 0.393 0.488 0.425 0.494
SAHSGOOD 0.358 0.480 0.366 0.482 0.359 0.480 0.347 0.476
SAHSFAIR 0.101 0.301 0.108 0.310 0.107 0.309 0.080 0.271
SAHSPOOR 0.012 0.109 0.013 0.112 0.012 0.108 0.012 0.109
SAHSMISS 0.004 0.059 0.006 0.077 0.002 0.048 0.001 0.034
MCSA 44.967 13.712 44.648 13.834 44.316 14.093 46.308 12.915
PCSA 47.919 11.229 47.830 11.012 47.707 11.969 48.329 10.609
SMOKE 0.183 0.387 0.191 0.393 0.193 0.395 0.156 0.363
ALCRISK 0.036 0.186 0.055 0.228 0.037 0.190 0.036 0.187
BMI 23.649 4.914 22.889 4.454 23.900 4.981 24.564 5.332
BMIMISS 0.080 0.271 0.096 0.295 0.067 0.251 0.069 0.253
NOEX* 0.119 0.324 0.150 0.357 0.097 0.296 0.091 0.288
LOWEX 0.320 0.466 0.287 0.452 0.340 0.474 0.355 0.479
MODEX 0.466 0.427 0.256 0.436 0.227 0.419 0.225 0.418
HIGHEX 0.306 0.461 0.301 0.459 0.309 0.462 0.312 0.463
MISSEX 0.015 0.121 0.007 0.081 0.026 0.159 0.016 0.127
DIABETES 0.007 0.085 0.010 0.102 0.003 0.055 0.007 0.086
HEARTDIS 0.003 0.052 0.004 0.062 0.002 0.039 0.002 0.049
ASTHMA 0.167 0.373 0.248 0.432 0.111 0.314 0.100 0.300
ENDOM 0.019 0.135 -- -- 0.031 0.173 0.034 0.182
HEPAB 0.002 0.040 -- -- 0.003 0.055 0.002 0.049
CANCER 0.012 0.110 0.016 0.124 0.008 0.092 0.011 0.106
OTHERILL 0.423 0.494 0.344 0.475 0.497 0.500 0.461 0.498
AUS* 0.917 0.276 0.907 0.290 0.922 0.268 0.926 0.261
ENGLISH 0.036 0.186 0.038 0.191 0.035 0.184 0.034 0.182
COBOTHER 0.008 0.091 0.010 0.097 0.008 0.088 0.007 0.085
EUROPE 0.010 0.098 0.011 0.102 0.009 0.096 0.009 0.095
ASIA 0.022 0.146 0.027 0.162 0.019 0.138 0.017 0.128
COBMISS 0.007 0.084 0.008 0.088 0.007 0.081 0.006 0.079
ACCESS1* 0.518 0.500 -- -- 0.497 0.500 0.545 0.498
ACCESS2 0.288 0.453 -- -- 0.294 0.455 0.281 0.450
ACCESS3 0.119 0.324 -- -- 0.128 0.334 0.109 0.312
ACCESSMISS 0.074 0.262 -- -- 0.082 0.274 0.065 0.246
31341 14070 9528 7743
Total Sample Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
 
* indicates the omitted category from a group of dummy variables 
  
 
9.3  Appendix 3: Complete Set of Comparative Results 
N = 14,070 N = 9,528 N = 7,743 N = 17,271 N = 17,271 N = 17,271 N = 15,486
T = 1 T = 1 T = 1 T = 2 T = 2 T = 2 T = 2
constant 0.244 (0.213) 0.411 (0.286) -1.279 (0.340) -0.090 (0.474) 0.277 (0.582) -1.237 (0.355) -1.158 (0.398)
Y2000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.368 (0.055) -0.514 (0.112) -0.315 (0.075) -0.587 (0.158)
PHI-1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.123 (0.043) 1.140 (0.044)
PHI0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.449 (0.048) 0.480 (0.049)
INC1 -- -- 0.294 (0.088) 0.236 (0.087) 0.331 (0.106) 0.014 (0.140) 0.038 (0.116) 0.049 (0.117)
INC2 -- -- 0.098 (0.071) 0.126 (0.077) 0.147 (0.089) 0.030 (0.115) 0.018 (0.096) 0.028 (0.097)
INC4 -- -- -0.082 (0.053) -0.054 (0.066) -0.172 (0.070) -0.156 (0.091) -0.075 (0.076) -0.067 (0.077)
INC5 -- -- -0.089 (0.052) 0.091 (0.066) -0.191 (0.070) -0.375 (0.092) -0.258 (0.077) -0.253 (0.078)
INC6 -- -- 0.010 (0.060) 0.181 (0.068) -0.030 (0.077) -0.319 (0.102) -0.153 (0.085) -0.152 (0.086)
INC7 -- -- 0.492 (0.097) 0.500 (0.080) 0.645 (0.101) 0.277 (0.132) 0.363 (0.110) 0.362 (0.111)
INC8 -- -- 0.635 (0.243) 0.866 (0.138) 1.254 (0.209) 0.822 (0.262) 0.675 (0.209) 0.689 (0.211)
INCMISS -- -- -0.107 (0.071) 0.199 (0.082) -0.058 (0.093) -0.149 (0.126) -0.156 (0.105) -0.147 (0.106)
HINC1 -- -- -0.989 (0.282) -0.197 (0.269) -1.129 (0.322) -0.771 (0.401) -0.711 (0.332) -0.703 (0.333)
HINC2 -- -- -0.704 (0.238) -0.534 (0.304) -1.201 (0.326) -0.854 (0.400) -0.855 (0.337) -0.863 (0.341)
HINC3 -- -- -0.619 (0.122) -0.555 (0.169) -0.916 (0.171) -0.170 (0.223) -0.146 (0.185) -0.145 (0.186)
HINC4 -- -- -0.528 (0.077) -0.532 (0.100) -0.851 (0.106) -0.327 (0.138) -0.275 (0.115) -0.282 (0.117)
HINC5 -- -- -0.383 (0.060) -0.387 (0.070) -0.648 (0.080) -0.272 (0.107) -0.173 (0.089) -0.169 (0.090)
HINC6 -- -- -0.354 (0.052) -0.416 (0.057) -0.588 (0.067) -0.248 (0.087) -0.182 (0.073) -0.175 (0.073)
HINC7 -- -- -0.233 (0.047) -0.190 (0.049) -0.368 (0.058) -0.247 (0.073) -0.182 (0.061) -0.183 (0.062)
HINCMISS -- -- -0.204 (0.049) -0.244 (0.055) -0.402 (0.064) -0.192 (0.084) -0.133 (0.071) -0.129 (0.071)
HINCALONE -- -- -0.393 (0.074) -0.226 (0.076) -0.611 (0.093) -0.361 (0.121) -0.262 (0.102) -0.260 (0.102)
AGE  -0.027 (0.009) -0.015 (0.010) 0.049 (0.011) 0.021 (0.016) 0.018 (0.038) 0.036 (0.026) -0.047 (0.052)
EMPLOYED -0.200 (0.026) 0.159 (0.049) 0.067 (0.051) 0.203 (0.062) 0.083 (0.082) 0.113 (0.069) 0.103 (0.069)
TERTIARY 0.272 (0.041) 0.236 (0.038) 0.289 (0.043) 0.484 (0.057) -0.081 (0.112) -0.196 (0.082) -0.285 (0.089)
DIPLOMA -0.078 (0.035) 0.073 (0.041) 0.107 (0.045) 0.146 (0.060) 0.028 (0.096) 0.004 (0.073) -0.039 (0.077)
OTHERQUAL -0.183 (0.082) -0.043 (0.088) 0.013 (0.093) -0.104 (0.124) -0.194 (0.189) -0.176 (0.144) -0.184 (0.153)
QUALMISS -0.034 (0.185) 0.000 (0.083) 0.014 (0.108) 0.066 (0.115) 0.127 (0.154) 0.135 (0.124) 0.097 (0.128)
VIC 0.004 (0.033) -0.203 (0.039) -0.252 (0.043) -0.407 (0.061) -0.410 (0.156) -0.367 (0.124) -0.377 (0.127)
QLD 0.118 (0.035) 0.095 (0.041) 0.075 (0.045) 0.075 (0.063) -0.553 (0.151) -0.469 (0.120) -0.473 (0.123)
SA 0.175 (0.047) 0.016 (0.057) -0.046 (0.062) -0.036 (0.088) -0.439 (0.246) -0.393 (0.198) -0.440 (0.201)
W A 0.295 (0.045) 0.292 (0.052) 0.166 (0.059) 0.389 (0.082) -0.200 (0.229) -0.167 (0.185) -0.174 (0.188)
TAS 0.211 (0.068) 0.139 (0.080) 0.012 (0.093) 0.093 (0.125) -0.133 (0.284) -0.226 (0.226) -0.218 (0.231)
NT 0.248 (0.137) -0.072 (0.149) -0.114 (0.150) -0.210 (0.203) -0.313 (0.316) -0.386 (0.253) -0.426 (0.260)
ACT -0.243 (0.090) -0.060 (0.102) -0.124 (0.105) -0.120 (0.142) 0.342 (0.233) 0.170 (0.181) 0.113 (0.187)
STATEMISS 0.316 (0.509) 0.100 (0.214) -0.107 (0.302) 0.119 (0.483) -0.306 (0.543) -0.046 (0.444) -0.014 (0.450)
RURAL -0.331 (0.026) -0.220 (0.031) -0.231 (0.036) -0.364 (0.046) -0.070 (0.075) -0.149 (0.059) -0.158 (0.061)
REMOTE -0.100 (0.067) 0.149 (0.076) 0.127 (0.084) 0.184 (0.108) 0.091 (0.164) 0.009 (0.130) -0.001 (0.134)
AREAMISS -0.215 (0.276) -- -- -0.242 (0.278) -0.720 (0.452) -0.649 (0.494) -0.569 (0.402) -0.617 (0.407)
MARRIED -0.015 (0.046) 0.106 (0.042) 0.343 (0.047) 0.331 (0.058) 0.297 (0.083) 0.313 (0.065) 0.340 (0.068)
DEFACTO -0.390 (0.042) -0.251 (0.041) -0.187 (0.049) -0.373 (0.056) -0.058 (0.071) 0.029 (0.056) 0.042 (0.058)
SEPDIVWID -0.548 (0.170) 0.024 (0.131) 0.074 (0.095) 0.098 (0.136) 0.346 (0.193) 0.261 (0.156) 0.256 (0.162)
MARISTATMISS -0.174 (0.182) -0.379 (0.233) 0.062 (0.252) -0.369 (0.296) -0.311 (0.339) -0.327 (0.262) -0.245 (0.279)
HAVECHILD -0.306 (0.038) -0.177 (0.044) -0.236 (0.050) -0.315 (0.059) -0.023 (0.077) -0.060 (0.060) -0.094 (0.063)
PREGLESS12 -0.297 (0.053) -0.024 (0.065) 0.240 (0.055) 0.201 (0.070) 0.175 (0.083) 0.143 (0.065) 0.104 (0.068)
CURRPREG -0.074 (0.072) 0.023 (0.070) 0.016 (0.056) 0.016 (0.074) 0.149 (0.088) 0.112 (0.070) 0.103 (0.072)





















N = 14,070 N = 9,528 N = 7,743 N = 17,271 N = 17,271 N = 17,271 N = 15,486
T = 1 T = 1 T = 1 T = 2 T = 2 T = 2 T = 2
HEALTHCARD -- -- -0.185 (0.043) -0.129 (0.051) -0.221 (0.057) -0.131 (0.060) -0.065 (0.042) -0.045 (0.045)
SAHSVGOOD -0.048 (0.038) -0.019 (0.045) -0.047 (0.048) -0.096 (0.058) -0.152 (0.074) -0.130 (0.058) -0.139 (0.060)
SAHSGOOD -0.104 (0.041) -0.058 (0.049) -0.017 (0.053) -0.122 (0.065) -0.192 (0.086) -0.129 (0.067) -0.137 (0.070)
SAHSFAIR -0.109 (0.055) -0.020 (0.065) -0.103 (0.078) -0.148 (0.090) -0.139 (0.116) -0.086 (0.090) -0.091 (0.095)
SAHSPOOR -0.200 (0.126) 0.065 (0.142) -0.050 (0.159) 0.001 (0.191) 0.003 (0.248) 0.014 (0.190) 0.021 (0.202)
SAHSMISS -0.010 (0.171) 0.412 (0.290) -0.042 (0.477) 0.630 (0.434) 0.732 (0.487) 0.396 (0.355) 0.291 (0.397)
MCSA 0.003 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
PCSA 0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002)
SMOKE -0.317 (0.034) -0.221 (0.040) -0.291 (0.046) -0.423 (0.060) 0.003 (0.102) -0.099 (0.077) -0.086 (0.082)
ALCRISK 0.072 (0.055) -0.111 (0.080) 0.052 (0.042) -0.177 (0.105) -0.106 (0.129) -0.016 (0.098) 0.002 (0.103)
BMI   -0.008 (0.003) -0.005 (0.003) -0.007 (0.003) -0.012 (0.005) 0.014 (0.014) 0.011 (0.010) 0.007 (0.011)
BMIMISS -0.303 (0.082) -0.292 (0.097) -0.351 (0.101) -0.642 (0.150) -0.674 (0.170) -0.415 (0.101) -0.414 (0.108)
LOWEX 0.050 (0.039) -0.045 (0.052) -0.074 (0.086) -0.129 (0.067) -0.178 (0.080) -0.122 (0.061) -0.150 (0.065)
MODEX 0.086 (0.040) -0.097 (0.056) -0.045 (0.049) -0.121 (0.072) -0.156 (0.086) -0.116 (0.066) -0.141 (0.070)
HIGHEX 0.074 (0.039) -0.051 (0.054) -0.012 (0.101) -0.051 (0.072) -0.094 (0.088) -0.072 (0.068) -0.078 (0.072)
MISSEX 0.203 (0.159) -0.367 (0.114) -0.152 (0.155) -0.523 (0.146) -0.430 (0.179) -0.324 (0.144) -0.336 (0.150)
DIABETES -0.106 (0.128) 0.295 (0.267) 0.175 (0.181) 0.332 (0.266) 0.311 (0.327) 0.210 (0.250) 0.203 (0.264)
HEARTDIS 0.181 (0.190) 0.436 (0.350) 0.237 (0.325) 0.386 (0.413) 0.280 (0.482) 0.306 (0.368) 0.068 (0.399)
ASTHMA 0.067 (0.028) 0.043 (0.046) 0.062 (0.052) 0.025 (0.064) -0.092 (0.087) -0.072 (0.066) -0.071 (0.070)
ENDOM -- -- 0.261 (0.080) 0.324 (0.085) 0.394 (0.108) 0.031 (0.163) 0.016 (0.136) 0.009 (0.137)
HEPAB -- -- -0.638 (0.342) -0.208 (0.348) -0.532 (0.409) 0.112 (0.614) 0.104 (0.515) 0.138 (0.521)
CANCER -- -- 0.258 (0.157) 0.105 (0.144) 0.264 (0.193) 0.523 (0.248) 0.348 (0.186) 0.370 (0.196)
OTHERILL 0.081 (0.026) -0.014 (0.030) -0.038 (0.032) -0.039 (0.039) -0.009 (0.049) 0.019 (0.038) 0.019 (0.040)
ENGLISH -0.224 (0.065) -0.249 (0.081) -0.230 (0.086) -0.444 (0.127) -0.505 (0.134) -0.212 (0.079) -0.215 (0.084)
COBOTHER -0.548 (0.134) -0.441 (0.171) -0.332 (0.182) -0.773 (0.270) -0.826 (0.281) -0.298 (0.165) -0.241 (0.176)
EUROPE -0.404 (0.123) -0.137 (0.148) 0.077 (0.157) -0.045 (0.233) -0.094 (0.243) 0.091 (0.142) 0.106 (0.153)
ASIA -0.470 (0.079) -0.069 (0.103) 0.129 (0.119) -0.008 (0.166) 0.033 (0.174) 0.208 (0.103) 0.249 (0.115)
COBMISS -0.224 (0.145) 0.097 (0.171) -0.030 (0.200) 0.041 (0.281) 0.086 (0.294) 0.044 (0.178) 0.043 (0.198)
ACCESS2 -0.329 (0.033) -0.262 (0.036) -0.481 (0.043) -0.291 (0.059) -0.252 (0.049) -0.257 (0.050)
ACCESS3 -0.534 (0.049) -0.424 (0.053) -0.799 (0.064) -0.541 (0.087) -0.463 (0.072) -0.469 (0.073)
ACCESSMISS -0.608 (0.058) -0.494 (0.066) -0.853 (0.077) -0.474 (0.104) -0.382 (0.087) -0.391 (0.087)
Log likelihood -7387.3 -5280.45 -4566.19 -8925.59 -8669.85 -7873.76 -7006.338
Sigmaa 1.583 (0.031) 1.634 (0.031) 0.591 (0.022) 0.597 (0.023)
ρ 0.715 (0.008) 0.728 (0.007) 0.259 (0.014) 0.263 (0.015)
LR statistic, ρ = 0 1964.8 2056.1 91.2 81.9
Pseudo R
2 0.0735 0.1086 0.1428
Balanced
Cross-section Cross-section Cross-section Static, random 
1996 2000 2003 Unbalanced Unbalanced
Static, random  Dynamic, random 
(7) (6)
Dynamic, random 







































Model 6 - Dynamic, unbalanced
Model 7 - Dynamic, balanced
Model 4 - Static, no means vector
Model 5 - Static, means vector
Model 3 - 2003







































Model 6 - Dynamic, Unbalanced
Model 7 - Dynamic, Balanced
Model 4 - Static, no means vector
Model 5 - Static, Means vector
Model 3 - 2003
Model 2 - 2000
  
 














  'Very Good'   'Good'   'Fair'   'Poor'
Category
Model 6 - Dynamic, Unbalanced
Model 7 - Dynamic, Balanced
Model 4 - Static, No Means Vector
Model 5 - Static, Means Vector
 
 